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JPRS L/9232

5 August 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 34/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

NEUTRON BOMB SEEN KEY TO DEFENSE OF FRANCE

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Jun 80 pp 36-40-41, 78

[Article by Jean Cau: "Nice N-Bomb!--And If It Were Our Only Hope of Escaping Holocaust"]

[Text] Carter has refused to build it--so as not to compromise the SALT agreements. The Russians give assurances that they are not preparing it. Only France, audaciously, announces that it knows how to make it, that it has perhaps made it and that it can produce it on the assembly line. Decision imminent. We are speaking, of course, of the neutron bomb, which divides the political world but on which all the military seem to be in agreement. It is the solution to the problem that invasion by conventional forces would pose to us. It is a Frenchman, Robert Ignace Dautray, scientific director for military applications in the Atomic Energy Commission, who is coordinating the research. "An exceptionally gifted mind," says Alain Peyrefitte, who gave him the job when he was minister of energy. In the following pages, Jean Cau opens up the neutron-bomb file. He has met with its "father." Both the one and the other find merits in it. Another fascinating application of neutron radiation: the new Maginot line of impassable radiation conceived of by Colonel Geneste and designed by Robert Bonneville.

For as long as there have been individuals, the enemy in war has had a face. But the question finally arose: how to wipe out an enemy called a "mass," with millions of men capable of being thrown into the battles? Nuclear firepower was then invented. Providence has taken care of everything. For mass societies, mass massacres. While it is true that since the end of World War II, these wild beasts that are the great nations have let peoples whose combatants they have encouraged, remote-controlled or armed tear one another to pieces around them, they have not fought directly against one another. Each has been content to let its claws and fangs grow while keeping an eye on the growth of those of its neighbors. Unfortunately or fortunately (as one chooses), this progression is not being halted. When we had already accustomed ourselves to our good old terrifying A-bombs and H-bombs, an unknown star appeared on the screens of terror: the neutron bomb.

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What is it? Rather--and first of all--who is its father? In 1943, a young American science student, Samuel Cohen, was called up and sent off to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) near Boston, to do engineering studies before being assigned to some technical service in the U.S. Army. He himself tells how one day, when he was very busy taking a nap and flunking an electronics course, he was brusquely awakened by a sergeant who brought him before an official. This official had been ordered to round up a few students at MIT to complete the device for a mysterious "Manhattan Project" (in fact, the construction of the first atomic bomb), and since he was pressed for time, he did not want to upset the classrooms and had asked the sergeant to bring him some students lounging in the cafeteria or snoring in the dormitories. And that is how Samuel Cohen soon found himself in Los Alamos, New Mexico. "And that," he says, "is how I became a 'nuclear scientist' by flunking a course!" Today he is about 60, in good shape. He loves Paris, where he is at the moment for the issuance of the book "Echec a la Guerre" [Checkmating War] (Editions Copernic), which he has written in collaboration with his friend the French Col Marc Geneste. Now that we have established the identity of the father, let us see who the child called N-bomb is. Very simple: it is a miniaturized thermonuclear weapon (a mini-H-bomb) fitted with a detonator (A-bomb or laser). Its novelty consists in this: whereas the explosion of a normal atomic bomb of the Hiroshima type liberates only 20 percent of its energy in neutron form (X-rays) but 80 percent in mechanical effects (blast) and thermal effects (heat), the proportion is reversed in the neutron bomb. Let us say that it radiates 80 percent and blasts and heats only 20 percent. (This formidable emission of neutrons is due to the use of tritium as the basic product. It is very expensive: 30 million centimes per gram, and 10 grams are needed for one small N-bomb. It replaces the lithium of conventional atomic bombs, and on contact with deuterium, produces the neutron flux.

There. Now you know everything.) The advantage of this bomb is therefore that it reduces the blast and heat effects very considerably beyond 300 m from the point of explosion. In counterpart, it releases a neutron flux so dense that it passes through the armor of tanks (for example) without destroying them, but irradiates the crews, paralyzes them and kills them. At the point of burst, where more than 1 trillion neutrons per cm^2 are released, it "dries them up" in a few minutes. At 500 m, one receives 30,000; at 1,000 m, 3,000. Now 600 are enough to doom any living being to death. "Does one suffer very much from irradiation, Mr Cohen?" "Less than from mortar-shell explosions. Roughly speaking, one feels all the symptoms of a very violent intestinal flu, with vomiting and diarrhea. But flu can be cured, while the radiation cannot." Bitterly, passionately, Samuel Cohen defends "his" bomb. Such is the charm of scientists even when they conceive the most terrible engines of death: they love their children and celebrate their qualities. "Are you, shall we say, embarrassed, Mr Cohen, at being the father of this bomb?" He is surprised and almost takes offense: "Me? No. Why should I be? Let's speak candidly, if you don't mind. After 20 years of strategic errors, Europe is militarily at the mercy of the Soviets, who are permitted all the political audacities by this situation. Now my bomb is 'clean,' since it has very little radioactive fallout despite its

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incredible effectiveness. It is the death ray, the death bath; it is the most effective device for crushing a ground offensive in which only the attackers would die. I have therefore struck a blow for peace, since I have invented a credible nuclear weapon, at least as regards strategic defense, for it upsets the Russians' offensive designs terribly. It can be used to kill but without destroying." "The fact remains that it is an abominable weapon."--"Listen, in order to have peace" (here it is Geneste who takes over from Samuel Cohen and replies to us) "there are two solutions: either improve human nature, which the church and a few idealists have been trying unsuccessfully to do for 10,000 years; or terrify the adversary, and if one is forced to do so, destroy him. Meanwhile, it is indispensable for us to make an effective umbrella without holes in it. This is the N-bomb."--"Which, Mr Cohen, as you humorously said to us, makes it possible to kill the sniper isolated in the belltower, even if he is a bishop, without razing the whole village."--"Yes, and it is in this way that it is useful for close combat, since it wipes out all life at the ground surface, even if you are protected by armor." Seriously, what would one do if the 50,000 Soviet tanks all started moving?

Fry their crews with the N-bomb. One can imagine that the Russians, who every month make a number of new tanks equivalent to all those that the French Army has (most of which, besides, are more than 16 years old!), would be fairly upset at the thought that their armada might be good for nothing but scrap. Whence their loud cries, the most extravagant of which is: "The N-bomb is a capitalist weapon! It kills persons and spares property!" Colonel Geneste's reply: "And the bayonet?" And he adds: "To good people, deterrence means preventing war, but this is only a theory. With deterrence, one must also have the desire to use it, and pressing the button to exchange the absolute 'vitrification' of France for the destruction of a few Soviet cities is all well and good, but it is to forget that the other side is 100 times bigger. We can wound it, but it wipes us out and there is no battle." Whereas with the neutron bomb, its partisans assure, everything is different. It is a battle weapon and comes under a different concept than the weapon of pure terror (the A-bomb or H-bomb packed with frightful megatonnage). It obliges the Soviets to reconsider their entire strategy. Indeed, in the present state of affairs, they are, as Colonel Geneste says, 100 times bigger than we, and in the event of thermonuclear confrontation could wipe us off the map at a stroke. Except that they know that we are capable of wounding them seriously before we die if--obviously--we press the button. But would we press it or not? They can avoid the risk of this bet--a mortal one for us but very hard on them--by simply attacking with ground forces, since in this area, with their tidal wave of tanks, they also enjoy overwhelming superiority. In the face of that, we are defenseless unless we oppose the onslaught with a barrage of neutron bombs. In brief, these bombs oblige the Soviets, in their military thinking, to renounce the use of their formidable power of attack by ground forces, which they have never neglected--quite to the contrary!--to go on strengthening ceaselessly. "Neutron bomb? Very bothersome indeed! The Western tricksters now seem to have a battle weapon, whereas we were able to crush them without using thermonuclear weapons, to which--one never knows--they might have replied," the Rus-

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
sians think. It is a battle weapon because the N-bomb can be fired either by artillery, with 200-mm guns, or by rockets, airplanes or cruise missiles. Its weight? Light. Barely 200 kg. Tirelessly straining to explain its "advantages," Samuel Cohen and Colonel Geneste declare further that we are presently sitting on thousands of nuclear mines "ready to explode all at once, or nearly so, at the slightest signal, which might be automatic tomorrow if certain American projects that make one's hair stand on end (for those who have any) are carried out. In fact, it is planned, in order to save the thermonuclear bombs from 'counterstrikes,' by their opposite numbers, to do nothing less than send them off to their targets (that is, to the entire enemy territory) upon the 'missile alert' (Launch on alert system). Handing the fate of the world over to electronics! Which means, all in all, that the exploitation of the atom for explosive purposes in order to ensure 'deterrence by terror' can quite simply wipe our civilization off the map because of a false alert, a short circuit, a bad calculation or an escalation out of control. Such escalation could, in our day, result from the confrontations that are multiplying in the world up to the present, with peaks and troughs, but the aggravation of which could indeed ignite the ar-quebuses and the bombards in the heat of the action.... Therefore it was normal to ask whether the atom might provide, for deterrence, more intelligent solutions than its use in the brutal and unsubtle form in which we have known it so far and which was only a gigantic extrapolation of the explosive virtues of TNT--to such a point that the power of nuclear weapons is still expressed in terms of thousands of tons of conventional-explosive equivalent!... Thus was the neutron bomb born." Thanks to which, "deterrence would be ensured in a totally credible manner without the need to blow up the planet with the powder-magazine that asks only to explode under our feet. Under cover of the neutrons of tactical artillery, one could even envision clearing the civilized world of these mines by gradually reducing the 'hostage-execution platoons' constituted by all the H-bombs that make us run a frightful risk, constantly aggravated by the strategic armaments race, which has now become insane and incoercible."

Where does this famous N-bomb stand today? On the American side, everything is summarized in a few dates. 1957: the first tests are carried out in the United States, while Eisenhower is president. The team assigned to develop the bomb is led by Samuel Cohen and scientists of the Livermore laboratory in California. 1958: a bomb explodes 160 km from a Pacific island. 1963: one was fired in the Nevada desert. 1975: at the end of the Vietnam war, several neutron bombs were used "experimentally" in the middle of an intensive conventional B-52 bombardment to delay the push of the tanks toward Saigon. 1977: the Americans perfect the antimissile neutron bomb (for in addition to the mortal ionization that it causes in living tissue, the N-bomb also causes considerable damage to the electronic devices of nuclear warheads). But following a colossal propaganda campaign unleashed by the USSR, Carter blocks any decision.

1978: Carter, who wants to put some cards in Cyrus Vance's hand for starting a discussion about the SALT agreements, puts off manufacture of the antitank neutron bomb.

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On this map of Europe, the black dots represent what would be the line of Colonel Geneste's defensive barrage, along the border of the FRG. The defense would be complemented by the presence of atomic submarines in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean.

On the Soviet side, it is beyond doubt that they have mastered the techniques of the N-bomb and have made it. At what rate--since this bomb, a defensive weapon, is not their preferred weapon, since they have no attack by ground military forces to fear? A mystery. But there is no need for anxiety on Moscow's part: they are at the same point.

In 1978 they tested an N-bomb, while at the same time stirring up the entire world against the United States, which was ready to make it on the assembly line. Jimmy Carter replied sharply: "The Soviets know, and President Brezhnev knows, that the neutron weapon is designed to be used against a massive and perhaps overwhelming attack by tanks on Western Europe. The Soviets, for their part, have no use for a neutron weapon, and Mr Brezhnev's offer to abstain from manufacturing them makes no sense in the European theater. He knows this!" Nonetheless, in the same year, Carter gave in to Brezhnev. Arthur Peche, principal rapporteur for the military-programming law, declared to us: "This was the triumph of disinformation. In Europe, thanks to the Communist parties and the hazy intellectuals, the Russians conducted an incredible campaign against the 'immorality' of the N-bomb. This campaign had a certain effect on American puritanism. 'How can we Americans do something immoral?' Then we let ourselves be abused once more, which shows the extraordinary naivete of the Western world. Without giving battle, the Warsaw Pact has achieved formidable conventional superiority. Here is the result of a policy of renunciation!" Finally, where do we on the French side stand? Do we have "the" bomb? We probably do! (There is even talk of some

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10 bombs already developed while the green light--if it is given--from the Elysee which would lead to assembly-line production of the devices is awaited.)

And among us, who would its father be? Here we go back in time and find ourselves in Paris on 1 February 1928, when Robert Ignace Kouchelewitz was born, to a Jewish family of Russian origin. When war broke out, little Robert--whose father died as a deportee--was sent to the Causses, where he herded sheep while trying, with books, to give himself an elementary education. When the war ended (Alain Peyrefitte recounts all this in his book "Le Mal Francais [The French Sickness]), he timidly wanted to "risk the baccalaureate." He was admitted easily. On his return to Paris, he entered the National School of Arts and Crafts at the head of his class. His teachers, unanimous about this extraordinarily gifted student, advised him to apply to the Polytechnique. It was agreed that he not count on it! And he graduated at the head of his class in 1949! The following year, he decided not to call himself Kouchelewitz any longer, but Robert Dautray, and began his career as a mining engineer in Clermont-Ferrand. He was soon detached to the CEA (Atomic Energy Commission) at Saclay, where, according to Peyrefitte, "he did his exploits." The author of "Le Mal Francais," then minister of energy, then sought a new man to whom to entrust scientific management at the military-applications department of the CEA at Limeuil. "Dautray," writes Alain Peyrefitte, "had exactly the profile of the man that we needed. An exceptionally gifted mind that rapidly assimilates all the disciplines necessary for synthesis and master them; he was able to understand the language of the component analyses and reconcile them." Thus he became the father of the French H-bomb and, Peyrefitte concludes, "in August 1968, de Gaulle had one of his final joys when our first two H devices exploded." Since then, Robert Dautray has not ceased his specific research, under the direction of Jacques Chevalier--himself father of the French nuclear-submarine engine and director of military applications in the CEA--and can be considered the production supervisor for our N-bomb. He does not proclaim this. This palefaced man, who wears thick glasses with silver rims, shies away from publicity and glory. Upon his reception into the Academy of Sciences, he asked for the press not to be invited at all. He lives in a blind alley in Paris, in a small house with barred windows on which ivy winds. He contemplates, without entering the arena, the agitation occurring in France about his bomb and the superartillery that the neutron weapon would constitute--agitation that is increasingly sharp as the shadow of the Soviet colossus lengthens over Western Europe. The UDF [French Democratic Union], on the pretext, its report says, "that tomorrow Europe may be the major theater of a possible confrontation," is for it. Arthur Peché, UDF deputy and principal rapporteur of the military-programming law, declared to PARIS MATCH: "I want my country to have the best possible defense, and the most effective tool at the lowest cost. Then, when I heard talk about the neutron weapon, I tried to learn whether we had the technology for it. The answer is yes. We can produce it. I wanted to know if it could be integrated into the budgetary effort that we are devoting to our present forces. The answer was yes. My third concern was to know whether this weapon could be integrated into our strategic concept of deterrence. The answer is yes." For Mr

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Peché, then, there is no technical problem for France. Isn't it more than a budgetary problem? "We have the possibility of arriving at the development stage in the space of about 2 years.... Rockets, submarines--we have them while hoping not to have to use them, but one cannot rule out the possibility of the adversary's saying one day: 'I want to attempt a strike with conventional means.' We then have to be able to reply to him. We do not have the right to do without the neutron weapon, whether we like it or not, whether we have succumbed to disinformation or not. It is a question of responsibility.... It has been acknowledged, and Mr Bourges has confirmed it, that the Defense Council could take a certain number of decisions before summer. There was a meeting last week. There will be another. These are limited council meetings at a very high level. For my part, I am waiting to see what the president of the republic will say in his televised speech on 26 June, if the question is asked of him." General Mery, chief of staff of the armed forces, is also personally in favor of France's building the bomb. The RPR, faithful to the Gaullist "all or nothing" concept, is at present rather against this graduated and flexible response system.

The Communist Party is categorically against it, and the Socialist Party is obviously hostile.

If this campaign by those for it and against it is so lively, it is because it originates in the fact that for the last 30 years, Europe's security has depended entirely on American good will--on its will, period. There was absolute belief in the American nuclear umbrella. Now there is less belief in it. Far less--especially since the USSR has reached and gone beyond nuclear parity and has established a 4-to-1 ratio between its conventional forces and those that could be pitted against it.

It is against this background of anguish and terror that man will have to reach a decision before long. Yes or no to our neutron armament? Yes or no to "assembly-line" manufacture of N-bombs by France? For the time being, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the president of the republic, remains silent.

His responsibility, in the position he occupies and has wanted to occupy, is immense. Like the position, for that matter, of all those in our modern states and in these new times of the atom who have the supreme responsibility. In these new times, yes, for as Samuel Cohen and Marc Geneste write in a report of the Total Strategy Studies Circle (CEST), we have seen nothing yet: military application of nuclear energy is "still in its infancy. It is only 40 years old.... After a few decades of existence, the "military" atom--with due proportion kept in mind--has reached the level of its gunpowder ancestor of the first ages, the stage of the arquebuses and bombards. And in this report ("Earth without Massacre"), our two specialists explain that after the neutron bomb it would be time to go still farther along a road on which "terror would be less asinine and less malevolent." The solution exists. "We declare that it is possible to terrorize an enemy tribe and neutralize its ability to do harm without necessarily exterminating it while at the same time exterminating oneself.... It is sufficient to use controlled radioactivity as an instrument of terror, to abolish the collective death penalty with which we are all threatened today."

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On the basis of this preamble, it is necessary quote at length the American father of the N-bomb and the French military man, who know what they are talking and writing about: "This weapon exists potentially today: it is the gamma bomb, which we shall by that name because it derives its virtues from the [illegible] specific aspect of nuclear energy, nonexplosive, the possibility of spreading gamma rays as fearful as are the neutrons for individuals, but only at a distance, and whose effects, contrary to those of all the weapons that have preceded it, are totally controllable (1) in space, (2) in time, (3) in their intensity. Let us suppose that a rocket warhead, instead of exploding abruptly like the A, H and N devices, over an enemy city, or any other target, limits itself to showering down on the target a rain of micropellets previously activated in a nuclear reactor specifically designed for the purpose. A carpet of gamma rays falls down on the zone in question. Its dimensions are controllable. It is a function of the surface area covered by this rain, which is deadly after a time. Its effectiveness time is controllable in function of the duration of activity of the components chosen. Its intensity is controllable in function of the density of the micropellets, and of their nature. For the first time, it is a totally controllable weapon. And if the object of war is more 'control' than 'destruction,' such a device merits attention. Its effects on the enemy are spectacular. Because they are not immediately mortal, they force him, under pain of death, to get out of the target zone as quickly as possible, or go underground and not come out until the end of the 'treatment'; he could be there for a long time, and meanwhile would not be capable of doing any harm. One can imagine the reactions of a civilian population--of the East or of the West--suddenly covered by such a carpet of radiation.

"And to cap it all off, let us suppose that a small fraction of our micropellets is made luminescent by radiation, which is very easy. A sinister greenish glow would then blanket the target zone, marking the zone of slow death and at nighttime giving visible form to the bath of gamma rays to which civilians and military are exposed if they do not scam. Everyone would know that death was there. A hallucinating spectacle. With the help of nuclear mythology, all the inhabitants would take to their heels without waiting for the verdict of the Geiger counters giving the administrative order to evacuate.

It would be a militarily effective form of bombardment that would disarm of their personnel all the installations taking part in the war effort, and a morally charitable one, since it would give the inhabitants a few extra minutes to save their skins, while fixing the boundaries of the death zone, which one could get out of by running. And contrary to the H-bombs, it would give the aggressor the time and opportunity to reflect on the consequences of his acts and renounce them. Without breaking a window or killing anyone, except for traffic accidents or heart attacks attributable to panic. Terror without massacre...."

No, this is not science fiction. It is our reality. We are immersed in it. No matter what our ignorance and our desire "not to think about that," we are living this reality. Monstrous, apocalyptic in the proper sense of the

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word--war is there, insane but possible. The states are preparing for it, staggering budgets are swallowed up in it, strategists are thinking it out, the engines of war carry it on their sides. In this time, we are living our daily lives and what we believe lightheadedly to be "the great problems of the hour." We are living our lesiure, our work, our strikes, our unemployment, our political quarrels and our political sideshows. And too often, so lightheadedly, we tell ourselves that all our "difficulties" "have scraped the bottom of the barrel," whereas we are threatened with having something else scraped.

After an unimaginable self-genocide, a "scraping-away of humanity and the world." Horrified, some scientists who have developed the radical apocalypse are now trying to make it possible to lower the rungs of the ladder. By means of H-bombs or gamma bombs (and by means of what else tomorrow?), they want to negotiate the ravages of terror, at its zenith today. At one extreme, we should thank them for this. Our fate is in their hands. We have opened--I say "we" because these scientists are our own--the horrible Pandora's box. Only scientists are able, not to close it--that is impossible--but to control the now-wild winds that are escaping from it. In this --for peace, a mortal goddess, will never be eternal--lies our sole, our only hope.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF'S MARCHAIS: HIS PERSONALITY, STRATEGY REVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Jun 80 pp 3-11

["Excerpts" from "The Strategy of the Lie -- from the Kremlin to Georges Marchais" by Auguste Lecoecur: "Marchais or the Strategy of the Lie"]

[Text] A television star but also secretary general of the French Communist Party (PCF), through his political broadcasts on the different networks, Georges Marchais has attracted a vast public which is tickled with his verbal performances, outbursts and slyness, which comes on in an unsophisticated manner. During the past few years, his public has often found it difficult to follow the meanderings of this discourse on the successive options of his party. Auguste Lecoecur, former member of the resistance and Maurice Thorez' former secretary of state and heir until his exclusion from the party in 1954, has published "The Strategy of the Lie -- from the Kremlin to Georges Marchais" in the Editions Ramsay. In an exclusive report, PARIS MATCH here presents his analysis of the successive and apparently contradictory stands taken by the PCF's future candidate for the presidency.

As with many television viewers, we can be satisfied with holding our sides with laughter at each of Marchais' appearances on the little screen. Too many Frenchmen see in him a television star who has perfected his act and reached the peak of his career as a comedian. But let us be on our guard. There is nothing funny about this character. We can sense it through the uneasiness we feel between two spasms of laughter.

All else being equal, in 1917, after the fall of the Czarist regime, Lenin too was in his own way laughable in his pretensions. At Russia's first Soviet congress in June 1917, a Kerensky minister said "that there is no political party in Russia ready to assume full power." In the audience, a little man got up and shouted: "Yes, such a party does exist!" That man was Lenin and the party he was alluding to was the Bolshevik Party, weak, divided, just emerging from a state of illegality. There was a moment of general hilarity in the hall. Sneers and gibes broke out for a long time.

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A few months later, those who laughed had disappeared. Things might have been different if, in June 1917 instead of being received with laughter, Lenin had been taken seriously...

In the pages that follow, let no one expect to find God knows what sort of sensational revelation or spicy detail on the life of Georges Marchais. Such readers will be rapidly disappointed because that is not the object of this analysis. Marchais' daily life from 1943 to 1946, which he himself moreover takes pleasure in surrounding with an artistic and suspect kind of vagueness, is not in itself so important that we ought to dwell on it at length and in depth. The question of finding out whether, where, when, how and why Marchais went through the various stages of his doctrinaire training in the USSR is also, after all, of very minor interest. Once again, while these trivial questions make people squirm with joy in newspaper offices and when dining out, they are not very important to the ordinary citizen, whose search for information is of a quite different kind.

Communist Strategy: an Import

Let us remember that the policy of any communist party, in power or in the opposition, is the one that is dictated by its leader, period. Especially when, once it has gone through the delicate transitional phase of constituent leadership, such a party has finally managed to stabilize the organization and definitively establish the authority of the new secretary general at its head.

This absolute political ascendancy of one leader over the entire organization he embodies the spirit of is, at one and the same time, the distinguishing characteristic and the monopoly of a communist party. And from Augsburg to Kabul, again and again we find this consistency of behavior we see in Marchais and — beyond his mere person — throughout the party he personifies, unfortunately, this same logic of political policy. Just as the color and height of its flag permit us to identify the nationality and position of a ship, careful examination of Marchais' personality constitutes the privileged means of access to an overall understanding of the PCF's internal mechanisms and a correct interpretation of the strategy characteristic of it.

None of all, we understand nothing if we refuse to see that, unlike other parties, the PCF is not an organization of French creation. It was not created; it did not found itself. Its ideology, organizations, strategy and finally its very reason for existing are imports. An even more disconcerting point: Unlike his counterparts in the other parties, the secretary general, called on to lead the party, is in no way responsible to the rank and file for his acts and deeds. He does not have to accommodate the opinions of others in his views nor bend to the fluctuations of internal opinion which, on the contrary, in the democratic parties influences the behavior of the party machine.

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What has made this possible? Quite simply, the conditions under which the PCF was created. It is, paradoxically in fact, the fruit of the rejection of all the humanist traditions and democratic structures of the French socialist and worker movement. When he brought it to the baptismal font, Lenin subjected this party to a certain number of ideological and organizational imperatives. Later, all Stalin had to do was to finish the job by making an absolute feudal lord of the party in Moscow. From then on, permanently locked in its Bolshevik iron collar, the PCF was to go its way guided by its Soviet beacon, yesterday as it is today.

When a communist party leader suddenly decides to impose a new orientation on his party, it is not only the newspapermen or the public at large that he takes unawares, but also the party members. It would be tedious to give the complete list of these hairpin turns capable of disconcerting the most docile of members as well as those most used to such practices. From the German-Soviet Pact to the break with the Left Union, the PCF has followed a course with many ins and outs. Whether we call them "headings," "turning-points," "lines" or "curves" makes little difference. They are always rather brutal strategic breaks.

Commentators and historians are in the habit of making big issues of each of these phases, reactions or states of mind of this or that controversial intellectual or of some vague figure moving toward a spectacular break. They stick pins in their charts to mark these isolated instances, neglecting to point out the immense psychological backlash produced within the mass of the party members by this change of political line.

Even though their departure is more discreet, after having suddenly heard the new PCF line on the radio or television, thousands of followers from all social levels will nevertheless decide to leave the party without demanding what is due them. This bleeding of the ranks of the PCF is not kept track of officially; it only shows up in the nonpayment of dues...

Thorez Copied Lenin's Method

The party is changing but its leader has not budged, keeping his hand ever more firmly on the tiller. Thus, despite the many fluctuations in its political line, the PCF has in the end seen only two authentic leaders succeed to power since its "Bolshevization" in 1924-1926. Actually, we should note in parentheses the handful of empty figureheads charged with assuring interim leadership and handling current affairs. Just as Khrushchev in the USSR — as history has it — was in the end limited to effecting the transition between Stalin and Brezhnev without really managing to impose his will in a lasting way, since his original initiatives finally became cause for concern among the vigilant guardians of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Waldeck-Rochet was satisfied with playing minor roles for several years during the brief lapse of time separating the death of Thorez from Marchais' official arrival on the scene...

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In connection with this, the most widely-spread notion — among the public at large as well as among supposedly informed commentators — consists of interpreting communist behavior by explaining that Stalin represented the modern version of the cynical and bloodthirsty despot or that he displayed all the symptoms of a perfect imbalance due to paranoia or chronic megalomania and, consequently, in "Stalinism" we must see just a "transient, chance occurrence" with no future, an of course perverse, but aberrant and ephemeral detour from the otherwise just and proper course of Marxist-Leninism.

We are sorry to have to disillusion these obdurate utopians, but — at the risk of tempering their somewhat irrepressible optimism — they ought to convince themselves that Stalin's behavior was inspired by neither madness nor the egotism born of personal interest, but rather by an unshakable faith in an ideology of which he was the guarantor and zealous servant. While Stalin's policy seems frightful to us, it is not only because of the massacres and destruction it provoked and sanctioned, but also and especially because it has knowingly perpetuated the Leninist doctrine and its key principles of organization which quite naturally lead to such crimes and destruction, whereas without Stalin we might have hoped that this ill-fated ideology, with its principles of action, would not have survived Lenin. In France, from the start of the 1930's, Maurice Thorez in his turn showed that he had learned his lessons well. He too in fact served as the party's weapon. Moscow had imposed on him an inflexibility attuned to PCF policy. To achieve this, Thorez first had to consolidate his trusteeship. Then he got the idea of launching an all-out openness campaign with the watchword: "Open your mouths! No dummies in the party!"

One must really be very naive to still persist in interpreting that today as a sincere attempt at liberalization. Actually and with due allowance made, Thorez limited himself to copying the method that had been so successful for Lenin in 1921 and for Stalin in 1924. The "dummies" to be broken were those men who might have slowed Thorez down in his rise to power. As for the invitation to an open meeting of the minds and declarations of partisanism, this was in fact not made in approval of irreverence; rather, on the contrary, it was a quest for votes in praise of himself and an appeal to all of his supporters, virtual or confirmed.

These Oradours, Dubbed "Cleanup Operations"

From then on, the secretary general of the PCF systematically resorted to this device every time he thought he saw a hint of opposition to his rule forming or it seemed to him that this or that party bigwig was challenging his policy line with the risk that such disagreement would degenerate into the formation of a really organized faction. To remind us of this, let us recall these various affairs: Thorez versus Barbe-Celor in 1931, versus Doriot in 1934, versus Tillon-Marty in 1952, versus Servin-Casanova in 1961; Marchais versus Claude Roy in 1956 or, more recently, versus Garaudy in 1970 and Fiszbin in 1979...

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There was no reason for Thorez to be disappointed in his trainee (Marchais). The latter quickly had a chance to show how capable he was of being a staunch Stalinist supporter. Need we remind ourselves, for example, of his eloquent attitude when writer Claude Roy was excluded from the party. The latter had made the mistake of condemning — moreover, in conjunction with a number of other party members — the bloody Soviet intervention in Hungary. He was immediately summoned to his cell to appear before a sort of tribunal. It was precisely Marchais who, representing the party leadership, played the role of prosecutor in this sort of "Moscow trial" in France. But let us turn the floor over to Claude Roy:

"When I spoke of millions of innocent people being deported or executed in the USSR, of tens of thousands in Hungary, he raised his voice to peak volume. Violent anger: 'Yes,' shouted Marchais, 'they arrested people and they threw people into prison! Well, let me tell you: They didn't arrest enough of them! They didn't throw enough of them into prison! If they had been tougher and more vigilant, we would not be where we are today.'"

In accordance with this same kind of intellectual logic, Marchais today considers the genocide perpetrated by the Red Army in Afghanistan as a negligible matter. These mass-produced Oradours, which are called "clean-up operations" in the Soviet Union — the euphemism is a pithy one — are not reprehensible because they follow "the direction of history"... "You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs," Lenin said... And they are promising us a tasty omelet for the day after tomorrow. Go ahead and question the cook's methods afterwards! This morality in terms of a variable geometry is that of — we must after all bear this in mind — a future candidate for the presidency of the nation. Frenchmen, get ready to have your hearts skip a beat! In 1968 a party-internal offensive was outlined, capable of jeopardizing the career of Georges Marchais, whose promising rise had until then been effected without any major difficulty. Roger Garaudy, for example, who at that time was still a member of the Political Bureau, did not conceal his hostility toward Marchais in statements he made outside the party. But, within the party itself, opposition to Marchais was expressed essentially through the voice of Benoit Frachon, as Frischmann, who was also at the time a member of the Political Bureau, was later persuaded to reveal.

In 1968 Marchais Hoped for Police Repression

We must admit that 1968 was a really black year for the PCF... even that it was the worst it had seen since 1947. The situation inside the PCF was anything but satisfactory. At the head of the party machine, Waldeck-Rochet carried no weight at a time when the party needed someone capable of firmly gripping the tiller. Moreover, the process of replacing him had already been set in motion.

To achieve this, the Soviets, as always, expressed their preference through their spokesman, Jacques Duclos, used to this kind of responsibility. The

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Kremlin's candidate to succeed Waldeck-Rochet was Georges Marchais. Now, not all of the members of the Political Bureau were very keen on supporting such a candidate. Feeling that he had enough internal support, Roger Garaudy then decided to publicly oppose him (that is, of course, outside the party's regular organizations). We must admit that, once again, the situation itself in 1968 offered Garaudy solid grounds for justifying and illustrating his burgeoning dissidence. The PCF had indeed stepped up its shillyshallying and blundering. It had been caught napping by the great movement of university rebellion.

In L'HUMANITE of 3 May 1968, Marchais published — or rather, let us say, signed — an article, which has since become famous, entitled "Fake Revolutionaries to Be Exposed." In it, he bluntly said that the Sorbonne student Fronde was merely an action produced by "a handful of small leftist groups" which had to be liquidated. The author of the article could have satisfied himself with suggesting to "the mass of nonleftist students" to go and try to reason with the few black sheep. But no, Marchais appealed directly to the government to take steps calculated to restore the faculties to normal operation.

Carried away by the virulence of his criticism of the leaders of the student revolt, our editorialist maintained modest silence on the excesses of police repression when he did not go so far as to openly encourage it. Too often, we forget to say that the then minister of interior found in him a not so negligible and virtually unexpected source of support.

Grabbing the ball in mid-air, Garaudy and his friends expressed their disapproval — it goes without saying — of what looked like the adoption of an official position, judging it to be such that it would damage the party. It was true beyond any shadow of a doubt that this attitude did hurt the party, because the parliamentary elections, which in June immediately followed the events that had taken place, were also turned into a net decline in votes for the PCF.

Two months later, the shock produced by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia naturally only further emphasized this decline in public opinion in favor of the PCF. There, once again, Garaudy believed — wrongly — to have found in the current situation an ideal pretext for bettering his position.

A Code Message That Opened the Door to Power

But if the philosopher and the group of sympathizers that centered about him imagined that the twofold situation — national and international — would weigh in favor of their arguments and their wishes, they were sadly mistaken. Far from destroying Marchais' positions, it precipitated his rise to power and, at the same time, the discreet elimination of Waldeck-Rochet.

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Yes, of course, all the circumstances we have just discussed apparently dealt the party a severe blow but, as always, where the communist world is concerned, it is not the tip of the iceberg one should watch, but the submerged mass. Now this more or less concealed mass brought to bear the full weight of the ideology and the party machine. And on the contrary, the latter were considerably strengthened in the process.

Contrary to what Garaudy believed, Marchais had in no way made a mistake in publishing the article the machine had him sign in May 1968...

A real leader in power, he was not unaware of the fact that he had to get over one last hurdle, a major one at that: the favorable opinion of the Kremlin, that "nihil obstat" indispensable to the qualification and final confirmation of any potential secretary general. If it should be withheld, this formidable final approval is likely to bar the way to a future suppliant.

To obtain this, he was clever enough to send the Kremlin the code message that opened all the important doors to power to him. Indeed, let us not forget that in 1968 we were in the middle of a phase during which Moscow was obsessed with the danger the in its eyes growing influence of Maoism almost everywhere in the world represented (this was the era of the cultural revolution in China) and its leftist factions, which were proliferating, particularly in Europe.

Now, since Lenin, leftism has been one of the Soviet Union's most dangerous enemies. It has "to be cut out with a scalpel" (the Father of the Revolution said). In signing his famous article, which struck out at the protesting students with major excommunication — and which, furthermore, for the first time attracted the attention of everyone in the political world — Marchais deliberately — and opportunely — placed himself under the ideological jurisdiction of Moscow at that precise moment in the evolution of international communism. His obsession was the same as the Kremlin's and he showed the masters of Soviet Russia that someone in Paris was ready to place himself at their disposition... Marchais' lightning-like promotion to the PCF party machine was for the first time officially confirmed at the 19th PCF Congress in 1970, when he was appointed titular assistant secretary general. Now the usage and custom befitting this kind of communist ceremony demand that the lengthy speeches introducing and welcoming the recipient of the title rival one another in true dithyrambic style. All the party's rhetorical flowers were gathered to compose a bouquet in order to flatteringly expatiate on the numerous virtues and merits of the exceptional individual who had been called on to henceforth guide the destiny of the party down the path of an exultant future. Meanwhile, raised to white heat, the audience clapped in cadence, sometimes even going so far as to toss confetti into the air.

On that day, the job of introducing Marchais fell to Gaston Plissonier, formerly appointed by Waldeck-Rochet and his ex-colleague on the editorial staff of the newspaper LA TERRE before his accession to the administrative

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secretariat. Now, as panegyrics go, that one was rather brief. I leave it to the reader to figure out why. The speaker did not have much to say.

"Our comrade is 49 years old, is a metal worker and joined the party in 1947."

These few bits of information were then wrapped in a sham package. Not the slightest allusion to the Popular Front or the war or the liberation. It goes without saying that, if Marchais had been deported and had escaped in the process, the lyrical flight of eloquence on his service to the party would not have been lacking. But as such flights go, this one was more like an angel passing overhead...

Strange Silence of the Media on a Doubtful Past

For ages now, the party, Thorez, Duclos, Frachon and the whole machine -- including, and especially, those particularly responsible for liaison with Moscow -- had known all about Georges Marchais' troublesome family background. Furthermore, it turns out that, since at least 1963, the police and the General Information Bureau -- consequently the political world as well -- have been aware of the shady past this Communist leader has been carrying around with himself. Now no one has ever let the cat out of the bag. This is why Marchais was not taken seriously when he believed he had the right to say in court, under oath and between two sobs, that "he and his party (had been) the victims of a conspiracy from the moment he "had been) entrusted with his responsibilities." This bit of perjury was merely another link in a long chain of earlier lies. In fact, if we take into account Marchais' national responsibilities, we realize that they began when he joined the Central Committee in 1956 and then the Political Bureau in 1959. In 1961 he succeeded Marcel Servin in the post of national secretary to the organization, an event which the press of the time reported on rather widely. In February 1970 he was appointed -- as we have seen -- assistant secretary general, which means that since then he has been officially confirmed as the veritable boss of the party, since Waldeck-Rochet has been permanently kept out of party affairs due to his incurable illness.

There Was No Better Scarecrow Than Marchais

Once again, that election constituted an event that was of "number-one importance" for the entire press. Now the media would devote no space to the slightest commentary on the peculiar "holes" the new PCF leader's personal history was mysteriously shot through with.

So, since there was no leak between 1956 and February 1970, we must assume that a sort of gentlemen's agreement had been negotiated. A little later, we could see that even then the president, the predecessor of the current president, did not want the affair to be divulged... The first disturbing indication was the police record determined by the minister of interior's General Information Bureau. Before LA NATION SOCIALISTE published documents throwing light on Georges Marchais' real life, this record consisted of

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nothing but false information, favorable to Marchais. Thus, at the beginning of 1977 — I did say 1977 — this record still showed that Marchais "had been conscripted by the Forced Labor Service (STO)." Better yet, two paragraphs farther on, this record indicated "that it was impossible to know whether Mr Marchais had actually gone to Germany to work. There is no record of his departure nor of his return to France."

Now we understand how publication of these documents on Georges Marchais' voluntary departure for Germany, with all the pertinent details, could have upset the plans of this whole wonderful world...

Now, on the eve of the 1981 presidential elections, the demonstration of this can be easily made. No need to be an expert on politics to comprehend that no majority leader could dream of a better scarecrow than Marchais at the head of the PCF. The great risk for the right now in power is that it finds itself forced to oppose a good, credible candidate who comes from the Socialist Party (PS). For the majority, to mobilize and really go for the PS is not good tactics for a presidential election in which it has to take into consideration the support it derives from vote shifts and the national climate once the election is over. So, according to some, here comes providence or, according to others, the Kremlin, sending them Georges Marchais. First of all, in 1978 he helped them to win when, by breaking up the Left Union, he gave them an unexpected majority. Since then, the PS has again become the chief enemy. Socialist leaders likely to be candidates in 1981 have been taken by storm and subjected to the withering fire of Communist attacks.

Under the circumstances, why be surprised at the favor Marchais enjoys with Elysee newsmen on the radio and television? The more Marchais is seen in a favorable light, the better his chances of winning votes. From which electoral constituency will he take votes? The RPR [Rally for the Republic]? The UDF [French Democratic Union]? Enough joking around. He can recover votes from the PS (since his campaign has been eased and encouraged by the majority). Just a few points won by Marchais from the Socialist candidate would be a guarantee of victory for the majority candidate.

In 1973 Marchais had already benefited from this support. When all political parties were in the process of choosing candidates, the voting district where Marchais would be running was examined as were the other districts assigned to the different party leaders. In the first district of Val-de-Marne, Marchais' constituency, the Gaullists at first planned on choosing Pierre Charpy to run, but Clostermann became the candidate. He jumped into the ring, setting the tone for the campaign with a statement calculated to kick up a row:

"During the war," he said, "I shot down the German planes Marchais built. Today, I'm going to shoot him down."

In fact, the whole thing took no more than the time it takes to send a press communique. When it was announced that issue might be taken with

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Marchais' German past, the Elysee got that candidate to withdraw from the race and opposed Marchais with a candidate with principles and a low profile, Mme Laveille, who did not want to be supported by so dynamic a partner as Clostermann...

The entire French political world, and along with it the majority of the country's ordinary citizens, is now convinced that Georges Marchais deliberately smashed the Left Union, which he did not want to win in March 1978. A certain number of hypotheses are still being proposed, here and there, on the reasons that drove Marchais to make that decision. Yet, there is no mystery as to why he did so. Perhaps a bit late, Marchais drew inferences from his failure which, in the eyes of the oldest party members and the Soviets, was inevitable inasmuch as for the first time in the history of Socialist-Communist relations the PS appeared to be the major beneficiary of the PCF's unity strategy. Of course, Georges Marchais could not say that he had not been warned. Wanting to relieve concern, he announced to the Central Committee:

"We consider the joint program to be a step forward, enabling us to create the most favorable conditions for setting the masses in motion with regard to our ideas, our solutions and our objectives."

The 1973 parliamentary elections were a disappointment. At the 22d Congress, Marchais was persistent and wanted to clear the air by improving the party image in the country through more forceful criticism of the methods and means exercised in the USSR and the socialist countries and, by again becoming the first party of the Left Union through a fundamental criticism of the PS, to make the PCF appear to be the only hope of democratic revival for a socialism which would be flying the French colors.

Deliberate, Planned and Sustained Ambiguity

This national-communist or liberal-communist line convinced no one in the country. The PS continued to strengthen itself and the Soviets felt offended. That was where the attempt failed. Marchais had negotiated with M Mitterand and a fossilized PS, just barely risen from the ashes bequeathed by Guy Mollet and then he suddenly found himself up against a strengthened PS, very much alive, one that was the leading party in the Left Union. For Georges Marchais and the Communists, a victory of the Left Union should have consolidated a PCF victory and the defeat of the PS. This result was not obtained, which meant a defeat.

Ambiguity, miscalculation — these, more or less, are the terms an immediate analysis of the Communist policy brings to mind. It only becomes clear when projected into the future. We can then see that the ambiguity was deliberate, planned and sustained in order to achieve carefully concealed objectives. The Communists would not hesitate to get rid of anything that might, sooner or later, jeopardize them. For example: in 1939, they chose the Soviet-German Pact to the detriment of unity in the struggle against

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fascism; in 1947, they chose the Cominform to the detriment of unity for national reconstruction; in 1977, they chose defeat of the joint program to the detriment of the Left Union; in 1980, they have chosen Soviet aggression in Kabul to the detriment of East-West detente and peoples' right to guide their own destinies.

For the PCF as well as for all communist parties in power, initiatives that signal a change in policy are inspired by Kremlin strategy. While real, Marchais' passing falling-out with Brezhnev was merely an episode, brought on by Marchais' opportunist blunder, which never threatened active solidarity with the PCF in terms of Soviet foreign policy. To fully understand Marchais' opportunist blunder (blunder in Brezhnev's eyes), we have to go back a bit in time. We must bear in mind the difficulties encountered in Moscow starting with the death of Stalin in 1953: from Malenkov's swift passage, the elimination of Beria and what, including Molotov, was called the antiparty faction, then the 20th Congress in February 1956, from Khrushchev's reign until 1964 and the arrival of Brezhnev.

The problems Soviet leaders had to grapple with during each of these phases along with the intrigues they hatched in search of unity of thought and action in a stable situation had their repercussions in the other communist parties without, evidently, sparing the PCF. I will not go into the ups and downs the party experienced in France in order to keep the party in line with the policy that was incorrectly called de-Stalinization (we can talk of de-Stalinization when an ideological revision undertakes the de-Russification of party structures and ideology).

In reaction to the dogmatism of Stalinist leadership, Khrushchev wanted to give communism a more open, more human image. He set the example in taking liberal initiatives on the domestic scene. As for foreign affairs, he gave the signal for a renewal of the policy of rapprochement with the socialists and in reality restored the specific channels to a "peaceful transition to a parliamentary system." He favorably received the objections registered by Togliatti, who criticized not only Stalin, but also the system that had made his accession to power possible and the way he exercised it.

Khrushchev's reintroduction of "frontism," that is, the tactic of "extending one's hand to the other forces of the left," did not displease Thorez and even less so Waldeck-Rochet, who set the party on the road to a broad opening until the incident involving Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (itself in a way the result of the timid attempt to launch a kind of "socialism with a human face") put a sudden stop to his own aspirations.

Brezhnev Criticized Khrushchev's Progressivism

In his domestic policy, Marchais followed the same old course...

He had realized — and he said as much — that the path that had been followed until then was leading to an impasse. He opened the way to new prospects by saying at his meetings: "If we go on as we have, we will be

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celebrating the PCF's hundred-year anniversary as an opposition party."

He therefore proposed to march boldly down the path of union. Better yet, he wanted the PCF to no longer be in the opposition; that is, he was committed to concessions that make possible agreement on a government program, the program Waldeck-Rochet had dreamed of.

It was from that moment on that Brezhnev probably first became concerned over the situation. Without bringing in the "secret report," he criticized "Khrushchev's progressivism" and what he called his "subjective errors"; he condemned his predecessor's "fickle and experimental opportunism."

In France, while not condemning it, Marchais should at least have "evaluated" his predecessor's "opportunism" in the same way. But he was very careful not to do so and, quite the contrary, set out on the path that led to the joint government program. The success he banked on for his party was late in showing up. Pessimism gained ground. The analysis he made before the Central Committee the day after the March 1973 parliamentary elections, which hardly represented a success for the PCF, absolutely displeased the Soviets.

In fact, one of the reasons appealed to to explain the party's lack of success was that it was not distinct enough from the Eastern European communist regimes or that of the USSR. The Central Committee almost involuntarily — and that is the best way it could have happened — demonstrated that the Communists were getting into closer rapport — if I may use the term — with France by keeping their distance from Moscow.

The Soviet reproach can be summed up as follows: "You capitulate to the bourgeoisie's anti-Soviet campaigns and seek comfort in the shade of social democracy." Brezhnev reacted to Marchais like the boss of a company with his best worker who decides to set himself up in business for himself to compete with him.

The moment of greatest tension had not yet arrived. Shifts in temper became more frequent and appeared very clearly after Brezhnev, Zagladine and Marchais met at the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 7 December 1974. The PCF secretary general tried to demonstrate to his Soviet interlocutors that his policy of openness was a correct adaptation of the international movement's general strategy to conditions in France.

PCF Denied Existence of Gulag in Russia

What followed showed that Marchais had not convinced his partners in the discussion. The examples of Yugoslavia, China, Albania and others proved too well to the Soviets that, while national communism certainly did not destroy the party practicing it, it did deal a severe blow to international communism, without whose unity and discipline the USSR would on a worldwide scale lose its most effective means of action. What the Soviets laid open to question was not the "frontist" tactic, which in the past had always

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avored the PCF to the detriment of its partners, the Socialists in particular, but the political conditions and commitments conceded by the PCF in the 1972 joint program. They described these compromises as opportunist, reproached the PCF for having underestimated the strength of the Social Democratic Party and of having thus perhaps tied their hands in terms of international affairs.

Despite the warning of the Soviets and of many party members, Marchais insisted on following the same path. He gave his followers the impression of for the future being satisfied with a communist party that would serve as an auxiliary force for its joint program allies. He would administer — and alternatively at that — the affairs of the company born of the application of the joint government program.

As far as the USSR was concerned, the PCF's new behavior seemed to confirm this strategic hypothesis. Indeed, for a half a century the PCF had vehemently denied the existence of concentration camps in the USSR. Then, following French Television Channel 1's 11 December 1975 telecast of a report on a concentration camp in the Soviet Union, the PCF's Political Bureau the next day announced: "The film that was shown gives us an intolerable picture of the conditions of detention in this camp. Furthermore, the commentator said that some of the prisoners are political prisoners. This claim is of all the more interest to us inasmuch as there are in fact trials in the Soviet Union conducted against citizens because of the political positions they have adopted. Under the circumstances, the PCF's Political Bureau announces that, if the actual situation corresponds to the scenes that have been shown and if the Soviet authorities do not publicly deny that this is so, it wishes to express its profound surprise and most formal censure of the situation."

A month later, L'HUMANITE devoted a lengthy article entitled "Leonid Plyushch's Arrival in Paris" to the affair. On that occasion, the Communist daily cited an editorial by Rene Andrieux in which he wrote: "We are not indifferent to the case of mathematician Leonid Plyushch and we have long sought to obtain information on the matter.

"If it is true — and unfortunately to date no proof to the contrary has been offered — that he has been confined in a mental hospital because he had adopted a position opposed to certain aspects of Soviet policy or the regime itself, we can only very clearly confirm our total disapproval and demand that he be released as quickly as possible..."

When Plyushch was released and arrived in Paris, in the name of the PCF Pierre Juquin shook his hand at a public meeting. When Plyushch granted his first press conference, L'HUMANITE gave an objective account of it, one that was very unfavorable to the Soviet regime.

That same year, the problem of another famous Soviet dissident, Vladimir Bukovsky, provoked another PCF attack on the Soviets. When, in December

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1976, an exchange of two political prisoners was made, the release of Bukovsky for that of Chilean Communist Party secretary general Luis Corvalan, the only foreign communist leader who found a reason to stigmatize the transaction was Georges Marchais. He said:

Marchais Lost His National Aspirations in Corsica

"Two men, two political prisoners, have just become the object of a deplorable exchange... We feel that the bargaining that has taken place between a socialist country and a fascist country over the fate of two men who were tried for having exercised their inalienable human rights is inadmissible."

Quite evidently, Marchais wanted, with little expenditure of effort, to show that he retained his free will as far as Brezhnev is concerned. At the time, mention of the latter was systematically omitted from the columns of L'HUMANITE or he was referred to in driblets. For example, his 70th birthday, 19 December 1976, was the occasion for special festivities in the USSR. Out of a total of eight pages, PRAVDA devoted six to his birthday. He was showered with telegrams from every corner of the globe and — what could be more natural — from all communist party secretary generals — with one exception: Georges Marchais! From France there were messages from first statesman of the nation, President Giscard d'Estaing, from the first man of the opposition, Francois Mitterand, and from — Gaston Plissonnier in the name of the PCF! This gratuitous pettiness of Marchais admirably illustrates all the inconsistency of the man...

It was during this euphorious period that Marchais was hospitalized for a completely unimportant illness. This gave Mitterand an opportunity to make the following statement:

"The friendship I have for Georges Marchais and the consideration I have for his efforts — the Left Union owes him a lot — lead me to feel deep concern over the news." People were wrong in ridiculing this expression of esteem. Mitterand's error was not in expressing his esteem, which, given the domestic situation, Marchais well deserved, but in dimming the prospects of the communist movement and ignoring the ideological nature of its leaders. Marchais himself provided him with the confirmation of his error on his precipitous return in the summer of 1977 from his vacation in Corsica where he had "done a lot of thinking." To those who doubted the independence of his thinking, Marchais replied: "I am not returning from Moscow. I have not paid a visit to the Soviet Embassy."

He who tries to prove too much... Everyone knows that in our beautiful and democratic country Soviet "tourists" have the right to travel everywhere, naturally including Corsica. As for Paris, we have met with the Soviets there through Thorez, Duclos and at times Frachon without having to go to Moscow or their embassy in France. The Soviets have enough discreet apartments in Paris and the suburbs, comfortable country houses where we used to dine very discreetly "in a fraternal manner."

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Initiatives Assumed Without Consulting the Party

Still, this was merely anecdotic and we have shown this to be the case. There was no need for Marchais to go to Moscow and there was no reason for expecting any other conclusion than the one he brought back from Corsica in his suitcase. Soviet pressures, or their arguments, if you prefer, were right about Georges Marchais' national aspirations. Everything turned out the way the Kremlin wanted it to.

A little later, perhaps, Marchais realized that the Soviet criticisms were justified. He also realized that the Soviets, who had helped him — that is the least one can say of this — in his rise to the top of the PCF, could also contribute to promoting someone else. He delivered his self-criticism publicly, on television. Disregarding the debates of the public meetings with the Socialists, he said:

"The Left Union policy failed because we had illusions about the PS, because the masses did not assume enough responsibility for joint program objectives. We must build a new rank-and-file union based on concrete objectives corresponding to the needs of the workers."

Given the fact that in the language of Lenin and Stalin "needs of the workers" translates into "needs of the communist movement," Marchais was repeating word for word the criticisms the Soviets had leveled at him since 1973.

Today, with the coup in Kabul, the mass media have discovered that the PCF is following in the footsteps of the Soviets. This is an opportunity to observe that the press — with the exception of those newspapers managed or financed by the PCF — is in agreement in recognizing that in the field of foreign policy, the defense of Soviet interests is still the PCF's dominant concern and that it is only when French interests coincide with Russian interests that the Communists are good patriots.

These same newspapers, with the same unanimity, are also discovering that the secretary general of the PCF is the only one to assume political initiatives in the name of the party, which he does not consult since the party is an instrument for the application of the policy decided on at the top, not an organization for the elaboration of that policy. The rank-and-file member is kept up to date on these great decisions by the radio or television or by the "bourgeois press."

We had to have a public statement, like the one Henri Fiszbin made (to cite one of the most recent), for it to dawn on the press. Now the dissent revealed by Fiszbin is to be found in most of the cells.

We have to go a long way back to find a comparable situation.

The unrest among the rank and file is a reflection of criticisms from the surrounding environment, that is, from the mass of ordinary people who

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vote for the left. With the exception of the period of mutual bear hugs right after the liberation, a PCF leadership has never afforded the right as much satisfaction as the one Marchais heads... Marchais' independent aspirations with regard to the Kremlin have today, as we know, completely disappeared. On the occasion of four important political events, he has differed with the rest of the European communist movement. The first of these was Marchais' lone campaign at the end of 1979 against the installation of Pershing missiles in Europe, when the "Eurocommunists" did not follow his lead at all, moreover, no more than did the French Socialists, since the Soviet origin of that operation was too obvious. The second event was the PCF Political Bureau's statement after the Red Army's invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. In that communique, the PCF's Political Bureau described the Soviet aggression "as aid against a rebellion supported from abroad."

Keeping the Audience Amused to Make Them Forget Afghanistan

The communist parties which, along with Georges Marchais, sanctioned this lie were the same ones that sanctioned the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968. Among them are the satellite country parties and the communist parties of Portugal, the FRG, Luxembourg, Cyprus, etc., that is, those for whom the monthly paycheck from Brezhnev is indispensable to assure their means of existence.

The other parties, which did not sanction the Kabul coup, were the same ones that adopted a position against the Prague coup, including the communist parties of Italy, Spain, England, etc. Therefore, in considering in the words of its secretary general that the invasion of Afghanistan was a "normal procedure," the PCF was the only party to shift from one camp to the other.

The third event that permitted Marchais to abandon his European communist movement "friends" was his trip to Moscow, made 3 days after the Political Bureau communique we just mentioned. After having beforehand in vain attempted to entice Berlinguer in Rome, Marchais once more singled himself out from the others, but this time through his absolute alinement with Moscow.

This trip was for him an opportunity to gauge the rank he held in the Soviet harem. He was the object of exceptional honors and favors of the kind the Kremlin reserves only for a titular chief of state. On his departure from Paris and on his return, he was greeted by Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko. On his arrival in Moscow and on his departure, he was received at the airport and reaccompanied to it by the team of Suslov and Ponomarev, a ceremonial engaged in only for guests who have proven their greatest docility with regard to Kremlin ukases.

During his stay, the Soviet press was mobilized and devoted as much space and time to him as to a foreign chief of state of one of the satellite countries. Heaped with honors, Marchais was granted three consecutive

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conversations with Brezhnev, an extremely rare privilege.

The fourth event that marked Marchais' final about-face in the direction of Moscow was the conference of European communist parties held in Paris on 28-29 April. First of all, as coorganizer of the conference and chairman, Marchais blithely retracted what he had said at the previous East Berlin conference in June 1976, when he was opposed to the holding of a conference of the same kind in the future. So, the Paris conference (which he consented to convoke at the request of the Soviets) was merely a sort of repetition of the one held in East Berlin in June 1976, including its title. In 1976: Conference for Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe. In 1980: Conference for Peace and Disarmament in Europe. The same cliché, but this time to keep the audience amused while the Russians were with difficulty digesting Afghanistan.

However, there is a major difference between these two conferences: In Berlin, it was a success in terms of number of participants; in Paris, it ended in a serious defeat.

PCF Could Not Evolve by One Iota

At the previous conference, in Berlin, the only Eastern bloc country missing was Albania and the only Western representative was the Icelandic Communist Party. At the Paris conference, there were more defections than attending parties. Ten European communist parties were absent and two others, the Swiss and Belgian parties, limited themselves to sending just "observers." The absentee record was broken at this international conference in Paris. The main reason for these rejections essentially has to do with Soviet aggression against Afghanistan.

The mistrust on the part of the "brother parties" is, of course, primarily due to the record of Marchais' activities since he has been secretary general of the PCF. Marchais, who has again become one of the Soviets' most effective vassals, is the only communist leader to have switched sides in such acrobatic fashion in the domains of domestic, European and international policy.

A conscious instrument of Soviet foreign policy, as he clearly expressed it to Frenchmen over television antennas, Marchais did not hesitate to sacrifice the Left Union in France and Eurocommunism in Europe.

What is obvious today was less so when the joint government program was signed. But men like Mitterand, Deferre and Mauroy, to mention only the most experienced Socialist politicians, were not apprentices in this field. The hopes the Communists have always entertained for the future, the methods of and means available to the leaders of the organization have held no secrets for them. They knew that the PCF could not evolve by one iota as long as it remained faithful to its ideology and its Leninist-Stalinist principles.

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From that point on, out of loyalty to the institutions of a liberal society and with the prospect of the establishment of a democratic and humane kind of socialism, Mitterand and his friends owed it to themselves not to reject the union and electoral agreements, but to refuse to sign a government agreement without having beforehand conducted an ideological debate which would expose the gulf that separates totalitarian communism from democratic socialism.

In breaking up the Left Union, in sanctioning Russian imperialist expansionism in Kabul and elsewhere, the PCF itself today imposes the need for an ideological debate. So, once again, the PS, which should have been present on a field of action that could only be favorable to it, has placed itself on the defensive. It is afraid it would suffer an electoral defeat in 1981 and has taken refuge behind its 1972 signature! It is paralyzed by its fear of communism, which it does not know "how to deal with" and its fear of "what they will say in L'HUMANITE," for which Leon Blum in his time had already reproached it. This kind of objective submission, this fear of being branded anticommunist was imposed on it by the PCF through a still effective tactic.

A Very Well-Perfected Terrorist Method

Thus, the PCF opposes any criticism, whatever it may be, with a barrage whose everlasting effectiveness it is aware of. It yells: "Narrow-minded" or "crass" anticommunism. This method of intellectual terrorism works wonderfully well because it relies on the bad consciences of the adversaries this argument, as hollow as it is, succeeds in making feel guilty, at once and beyond all expectations by disqualifying their speeches in advance. Thus, consenting to remain on the defensive, the partner in the discussion hastens to deny the inflammatory accusation and swears to God that he is not opposed — far from it — to communism or the PCF or the Soviet Union, as though it were a matter of as many tabus. This devotion (to repeat a term used by Jean-Francois Revel) of free men is the poisoned apple represented by the practice of ideological capitulation to communist totalitarianism. But it also stems from the terror-fascination effect produced by a communist party so certain of its future victory, as it is of the inevitable triumph of Soviet communism over the whole world, that it cannot stand for even a hint of criticism, much less a challenge. The specter of Munich, which hangs over the actions of the Western leaders, like the intellectual and moral account-rendering of the chief socialist leaders, can only comfort the PCF in its attitude.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

GAUDARD'S REASONS FOR QUITTING 'L'HUMANITE' STAFF DISCUSSED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 28 Jun 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Thierry Pfister: "Resignation From 'L'HUMANITE'"]

[Text] "Could you work anywhere else but L'HUMANITE?" Harris and Sedouy asked Jean-Pierre Gaudard 6 years ago. "No," replied the head of the economics department of the communist daily. He explained: "I follow an ideology before I follow a trade." At the L'HUMANITE staff conference on Wednesday, Roland Leroy was nevertheless forced to announce the resignation of Jean-Pierre Gaudard.

Several weeks of discussions with the PCF leadership could not make this young rising star of the communist press go back on his decision. He believes that he can no longer carry on in his profession. The position of the PCF on Afghanistan also seems to have played a decisive role in his feelings. It is true that Gaudard, who joined the party in 1966, is the prototype of the new communists shaped through the march toward unity and who want a complete de-Stalinization of their group. "The most serious error is not to live democratically," Gaudard explained to Harris and Sedouy. "From that error stem all the others."

In fact, it is the absence of internal democracy that most troubles the new cadres of the PCF. This is true at L'HUMANITE and striking at REVOLUTION. The weekly's editorial staff meeting following the resignation of Francois Hincker from his duties as assistant editor and that of Serge Goffard was revealing. The lack of openness and confrontation is so deeply felt that Guy Hermier, editor of REVOLUTION, and Jean Burles, editor in chief, noted that none of their associates came to their defense during the debate. Their silence was eloquent.

The next session of the Central Committee will take up the situation thus created in the communist press, but also the case of Henri Fiszbin, whom Georges Marchais criticized for speaking out in LE MONDE.

Nothing would seem to indicate that this body of the PCF has any sudden desire to "live democratically."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ASPECTS OF PCF INTERNAL CRISIS EXAMINED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 21 Jun 80 p 32

[Article by Thierry Pfister]

[Text] Jean Elleinstein screams political censorship. He accuses the "Editions Sociales," an outfit controlled by the French Communist Party (PCF) to have withdrawn from him the coordination of the eight volumes of the "History of Contemporary France." To this Lucien Seve, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and director of the Editions Sociales replies matter of factly by underlining the serious delays of Jean Elleinstein in the delivery of promised texts. The position of the protesting communist historian would be stronger if his difficulties were limited to the publishing firm of the PCF. This is not the case. Jean Elleinstein is in more or less serious conflict with the publishers Le Seuil, Grasset and Albin Michel. As to the publishers Stock they went so far as to have a part of the proceeds from the sale of the historian's library seized. In order to recoup unhonored contracts.

If there is political censorship in the PCF it should be looked for somewhere else. It is more serious and goes deeper. The crisis which is shaking REVOLUTION illustrates this. Francois Hincker, assistant chief editor of the weekly, in fact, just felt obliged to resign because Guy Hermier, member of the Political Bureau and director of REVOLUTION refused to approve one of his articles. It concerned, it is true, an answer to Lucien Marest, Hermier's collaborator at the section of intellectuals and culture of the Central Committee.

In two articles of REVOLUTION, Marest has just defined the new line of the party in cultural matters. It consists in the favoring of animation over creation. One does not go on admitting that the cultural centers of Communist municipalities produce works which do not attract the public, a complaint already voiced by Guy Poussy, group secretary of the Val-de-Marne district and mouthpiece of Georges Marchais. In its stride the direction of the PCF by the way intends to take charge again of the country groups. No more invitations of whichever singer to the local celebrations of the party. Renaud for instance is specifically outlawed. No more preference for the

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productions of "bourgeois" publishers rather than for those of the party workshops.

Francois Hincker had wanted to say that this policy would again make the options of the PCF questionable. He has been condemned to silence. This is most serious for REVOLUTION. Already in the strictly political field, the weekly had to toe the line or, as in the case of Afghanistan, shut up. If the direction of the party imposes on it the same rule in cultural matters the specific value of REVOLUTION disappears. As it is, the figures are not that great. The objective of 50,000 subscriptions is far from achieved. There are only 15,000 and the distribution amounts to around 40,000 copies. It is true that the young weekly--it published its 15th number--cannot count on the Communist press to become better known. L'HUMANITE ignores it and Roland Leroy forbids the journalists of the daily to give a leg up to REVOLUTION.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PRODUCTION OF NAVAL EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish May 80 pp 26-29

[Article by Artabro: "Italian Naval Exhibition"]

[Text] Italian technology in the military naval field appears, at present, to be one of the most complete and competitive technologies. Within it, the United Naval Shipyards (CNR) group coordinates and assembles a large part of the facilities and export capability.

Multipurpose Escorts

The "Lupo" and "Maestrale" class frigates have meant the definitive consolidation of Italian industry as an exporter of complete principal fighting ships, that is to say, with purely Italian technology in almost all their systems and subsystems.

The "Lupo" class ships are 2,525-ton ships, fully loaded, and are 113 meters long. Multipurpose is the basic aim within these moderate dimensions. Their basic gunnery is one 127/54 Oto Melara "Compatto" [compact] gun -- the gun with the most rapid fire that there is with that caliber -- and two Breda twin 40/70 antimissile mounts. Antiaircraft protection is increased by means of placing onboard an Albatros/Aspide point defense missile system, also with good antimissile capability, while the antiship capability goes much beyond the gunnery range by the receipt onboard of Otomat missiles, up to eight, with an impact distance limited by the radar horizon much more than by its own propulsive action radius. Antisubmarine activity is based on a medium-sized helicopter and short-range homing torpedoes, launchable both from the frigate and from the helicopter.

The electronic equipment on the "Lupo" class ships, and particularly the sensors, are also mostly of Italian technology, with the exception of the sonar. Although they are variable, depending on the request, they are naturally incorporated in the ship's weapons system. The matter of support measures and electronic countermeasures, especially sophisticated, is to be emphasized particularly. Propulsion, of the CODAG

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[expansion unknown] type, makes maximum speeds on the order of 35 knots possible, very infrequent in modern escort ships, with 31.7 knots sustained speed (40,000 horsepower), but with only 7,800 horsepower, maximum sustained diesel power, it is possible to maintain 20 knots. This makes very great radiuses of action (5,500 miles at 16 knots) possible.

In short, the "Lupo" design has sought to combine multipurpose, good performance and economy. This kind of frigate can operate both by itself and on escort duty. It can also be incorporated in air-sea tactical groups, regardless of how fast they are. Four units were built for the Italian Navy, at the same time as the Peruvian Navy ordered four more (of the "Carvajal" series) and the Venezuelan Navy ordered six ("Mariscal Sucre" series), in both cases with local variants. The first one of all, "Lupo," was finished in 1977.

The "Maestrale" design, produced in principle on order by the Italian Navy to proceed to build six units, is merely an enlarged and improved "Lupo." The displacement now increases to 3,040 tons full load, with a length somewhat less than 123 meters. By using somewhat more powerful diesels than the "Lupo" class, but with the same FIAT/General Electric LM 2500 gas turbines, the maximum speed barely exceeds 33 knots, still higher than what is normal in recent constructions, but the action radius is 6,000 miles at 15 knots. Its military capability seems to be increased, in comparison with the preceding design, primarily in the antisubmarine area:

There are two medium-sized ship-borne helicopters, or one heavy helicopter, all with air-to-surface combat facilities.

Wire-guided 533-millimeter long torpedoes are added (Italian A-184).

The hull sonar seems to be supplemented by another variable depth sonar (system identical to the systems of the Spanish "Descubierta" class corvettes, second series).

The radical increase in hangar capacity is owing to the shifting of the Aspide/Albatros missile launcher to the bow.

Although up to now only the Italian Navy is continuing to order escorts of this class, it seems beyond all doubt that new orders, coming especially from navies using American World War II destroyers, will follow them, particularly when the first units become tangible.

Smaller Units

The CNR offers a very wide range of alternatives, both in dimensions and in assignments and functions, in the field of small combatant ships.

The largest patrol craft produced so far by the Italian company are in compliance with an order from the Libyan Navy, where they are building the "Wadi" series, four units, followed then by another order from Ecuador

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for six more. With dimensions similar to the FPB-58 design of the German Lurssen Company (the Spanish "Lazaga" class and the Israeli "Reshef" class), their displacement is definitely greater (630 to 685 tons full load, depending on the version). It allows various configurations of weapons, sensors and propulsion. This always affects the multipurpose feature of the basic design. In fact, these small ships tend to be classified as corvettes rather than as patrol craft. The installation of a 76/62 Oto Melara gun, the familiar "Compatto," and a twin 35 or 40-millimeter mount for close-in antimissile defense is common to all the variants provided. There also always are Otomat ship-to-ship missiles. The various versions are determined by the alternative presence of antisubmarine torpedoes, short-range antiaircraft missiles and even a helicopter, in spite of the small displacement of the design.

A project connected with the foregoing one, although with more originality, is the "Saettia," not yet ordered definitely, and whose armament and sensors are basically similar to the "Wadi" class, without antisubmarine weapons or antiaircraft missiles. The originality of the design lies in the almost elimination of superstructure, thanks to a high draft and considerable freeboard, which find expression in seaworthy features very superior to what is usual in ships of their size (360 tons full load) and much interior space. They also offer a small radar silhouette and few dead spots for gunnery fire. The theoretical speed probably reaches 40 knots with 20,000 horsepower.

Still in the line of missile-launching patrol craft, CNR pioneered construction of military hydrofoils in Western Europe, owing to its "Sparviero" prototype, completed in 1974. Its most remarkable detail is its compactness. On a hull with a maximum displacement of only 60 tons it houses a 76/62 Oto Melara gun and two Otomat missiles, with pertinent electronics. The "Sparviero" is capable of attaining 50 knots with a 4,500-horsepower gas turbine. Six more units are going to be produced for the Italian Navy (the factory name for the series is "Swordfish").

A number of other light combatant craft projects are offered by Breda, in Venice: 400-, 250- and 150-ton missile-launching boats, with various armament and equipment possibilities, including a helicopter with a telescopic hangar on the largest. At the same time, other specialized shipyards offer smaller craft, like the 41-ton and 8-ton fiberglass craft from CRESTITALIA, used by the Finance Guard owing to their high speed (34 knots), or the 21-ton patrol craft, also made of plastic, from INTERMARINE.

This Sarzana firm is precisely the one that has a contract with the Italian Navy to construct a series of Italian minesweepers, an Italian answer to the European tripartite design. Ten units are going to be produced for now, forming the "Lerici" series. It is an unquestionably interesting development and very comparable with the best of other navies.

With regard to logistic support ships, CNR produced two fleet supply ships for the Italian Navy, the "Vesubio" and the "Stromboli," displacing

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8,700 tons full load. Based on their experience, it offers enlarged designs of them, displacing 13,500 and 21,000 tons. This last-mentioned ship is a real surface fighting ship, because it adds, to its logistic capability, two heavy helicopters, Aspidite antiaircraft missiles and four 40/70 millimeter guns with electronic equipment similar to what is found on an escort ship. Breda, in turn, has designed a very complete 3,000-ton submarine rescue ship, capable of operating at great depths, especially if it uses the Breda 13-ton minisubmarine, capable of reaching a depth of 600 meters (with a safety coefficient of 1.25).

Onboard Weapons

Naval weapons have a possibly greater relative importance, within Italian exports, than the complete ships themselves, to the point of having made local industry one of the leaders of the world market.

Naval gunnery is very particularly the gatherer of the greatest exporting achievements and especially for the compact products of the Oto Melara Company. The 127/54, that we mentioned already when we discussed the "Lupo" and "Maestrale" frigates, has a very light mount (34 tons), with a very high rate of fire and both antiaircraft and surface capability. It has 66 rounds in continuous supply. It has received foreign orders (from Canada, in addition to importers of frigates built in Italy), but it seems that its commercial activity is just starting.

Nevertheless, the lighter 76/62 is the gun used most extensively all over the world among the new automatics. It has been adopted by over 20 navies, including the United States Navy, which calls it Mk-75. Altogether, it weighs 7.3 tons. It can fire 85 rounds a minute and maintain continuous bursts for a whole minute without serious damage to the barrel. This means that it is capable of putting more explosive weight in the air than a dual semiautomatic 126-millimeter mount, in the same time. Its low weight makes it possible to install it also on very light ships.

The variants that Breda has produced on the Bofors 40/70 guns are also noteworthy: the automatic loader for a single mount, providing 144 rounds in automatic ammunition supply and, especially, the closed twin mount, with a joint rate of fire of 600 rounds a minute and continuous ammunition supply of 444 or 736 rounds. This mount is shipborne particularly for antimissile purposes, above all since a proximity fuze was placed in service.

Breda also produces the 105-millimeter window and electronic decoy rocket launcher system, which also admits flare or ground bombardment rockets. Twenty-tube rocket launchers are made for medium-sized ships and 6-tube launchers for patrol boats and corvettes.

Another important item is torpedoes. Whitehead Motofides has produced substitutes for the American antisubmarine homing torpedoes, calling them A-244 and A-244S. Their same launching tubes can be used, although there

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is an autochthonous launching system, the ILAS-3 of ELSAG. A new long, 533-millimeter wire-guided torpedo, the A-184, is used on board the new "Maestrale" class frigates.

Concerning missiles, we have already commented on the performance of the ones used on the new frigates. The Aspide, incorporated in the Albatros control system, is a remarkable improvement of the NATO Sea Sparrow, with more maneuverability, greater range and wider margins of operation, in addition to increasing its antimissile capabilities. The Otomat, in its improved Teseo version, has a high degree of maneuverability for diversion in proximity to the target and it is highly immune to countermeasures. It is also the ship-to-ship missile with the greatest range on the whole Western market.

Electronics

This is another item that has been equipping Italian-constructed ships for years now, with our own technology.

The ELSAG Company not only produces radars, but also close-in defense systems (the Dardo), fire control systems and electronic decoy systems. ELETTRONICA SpA specializes in an electronic warfare system with a quality and advanced design that is without competition in the world. Thus, its countermeasures systems are used in many navies. ELMER produces communications and data-transmission systems. SELENIA is the prime contractor for long-range search radars and it also produces command and control systems for integrated weapons systems.

Engines

In conclusion, we can mention the existence of a wide variety of Italian propulsion systems. GMT produces its series 230, 20-cylinder diesels, used on frigates for economical propulsion at cruising and patrol speeds. Stabilimenti Meccanici, in Trieste, manufactures the VM TI-1312 series for small craft, with 380/480 horsepower, and CRM makes its series of 12-cylinder V CRM 12 D/SS diesels, in the 1085/1374 horsepower range, in Milan.

To meet the requirements for power and high acceleration in escort ships and fast ships, FIAT manufactures, under license, the General Electric LM2500 gas turbine, derived from the TG-39/CF-6 jet, which equips the commercial DC-10 for example, with a maximum power of 25,000 horsepower. FIAT also provides electronic automation systems for machinery.

Genoa

In summary, all this and much more is to appear in the Naval Exhibition, which will be amply covered by a team from DEFENSA.

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Participating Companies

(1) ASTILLEROS		(6) ARMAMENTO Y ELECTRONICA	
- Buques mayores (2)		Breda Meccanica Bresciana	Brescia
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Crestitalia	Ameglia	Fratelli Borletti	Milán
Intermarine	Sarzana	Gajon	Génova
Italcraft	Roma (13)	IRET	Trieste
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(4) SISTEMAS DE PROPULSION,		Litton Italiana	Pomezia
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Aifo	Milán	Misar	Ghedí
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I.F.E.N.	Roma	(9) Helicópteros navales	
Socogea/Intar	Génova	Costr. Aer. G. Augusta	Cascina Costa
Magnetit Marelli	Milán	Breda Nardi	Milán
Sace	Turín	(10) EQUIPOS ESPECIALES	
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		Officine Panerai	Florenzia
		Oleodinamica Magnaghi	Milán
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		Signani	La Spezia
		Technisub	Génova

Key: 1. shipyards; 2. large ships; 3. small ships; 4. propulsion systems; 5. electrical and auxiliary machinery; 6. armament and electronics; 7. naval aviation; 8. sea patrol and search aircraft; 9. naval helicopters; 10. special equipment; 11. Genoa; 12. Venice; 13. Rome; 14. Florence; 15. Naples; 16. Bologna

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ARMY UPGRADES TANKS, FIRST BMR-600 DELIVERED

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish No 25, May 80 pp 88, 90

[Text] The Spanish Army has been displaying considerable activity in the area of armored vehicles in the past few months with the incorporation, procurement and modernization of this type of equipment for its various units.

First came the signing of the contract with the Santa Barbara Military Industries National Enterprise last June for the construction of a new series of 100 AMX-30E cars, whose patent became the property of the Spanish Government precisely in 1980, a fact which will facilitate its production, improvement and modification.

The incorporation of the new M-48E (M-48A5) tanks, whose first 10 units were delivered to the Montesa 3d and the Alcantara 10th Armored Cavalry Regiments in Ceuta and Melilla, has been taking place since last August.

These vehicles form part of the first lot of 108 Spanish Army M-48 tanks undergoing thorough reconditioning and modernization at the Chrysler Espana company's facilities in Villaverde (see DEFENSE No 3).

The operation practically affects the whole tank, with the cupola, hull, engine cooling grilles and fenders undergoing transformations. They get a new AVDS-1790-2A diesel engine and transmission, have the final stages replaced, and the suspension and running gear repaired and improved. New fuel tanks also are installed. The driving and aiming optical system is improved and a new ballistic calculator is provided.

But all in all, what makes the modernization really worthwhile and upgrades the tanks is the installation of the 105/51mm L-7A2 gun, a weapon of acknowledged effectiveness, accuracy and quality employed by a large number of Western tanks (Leopard, M-60, Strv-103, Centurion, Pz-68, etc.).

This modernization brings the M-48E tanks, except for weight and mass, to the level of the tanks currently in service--especially the M-60, with which it has numerous details in common--and constitutes a significant increase in Spanish armored potential.

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That potential, according to official sources, will be augmented by a shipment of M-48A2 tanks acquired from the FRC that also will be modernized in Spain by the identical process applied to the others.

On the other hand, the first BMR-600 cars have come out of the ENASA factories in Valladolid and have been delivered to the Calatrava 2d Training Regiment of the Cavalry Academy and the Espana 11th RLAC [Light Armored Cavalry Regiment?], as well as a shipment to the Civil Guard UAR's [Rural Antiterrorist Unit]. There are studies and plans to equip armored and mechanized units with the various versions of the BMR-600 cars over the intermediate term, to replace tracked equipment as vehicles become available for this purpose. These vehicles consist of the BMR-600 PP basic version armed with an MG-3S 7.62mm machine gun on a Mowag mounting (made in Spain) and having a capacity of 13 men.

Regarding the BMR-600 and the M-41 cars, tests were recently conducted with HOT Mephisto turrets to ascertain their capabilities as antitank rocket launchers, and there is also a Chrysler Espana program for the modernization and modification of 180 M-41 cars by means of the installation of 500 HP diesel engines and 90mm guns.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

UNEMPLOYMENT DILEMMA CONTINUES TO WORSEN

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 8 Jun 80 pp 68-70

[Text] Nearly 750,000 unemployed will share more than 200 billion pesetas this year. But others who have reached the term of their benefits without finding new employment or who are seeking a job for the first time do not collect anything. In the meantime unemployment disbursements are emptying the public coffers and each day there are 1,000 additional jobless while no more than 10 billion pesetas are left for the employment program.

Each day more than 1,000 Spaniards become unemployed. In the first 3 months of 1980 recorded unemployment--those jobless who register as such at the offices of the National Employment Institute [INEM]--rose by 91,700, that is, by about 1,000 individuals daily. Unemployment, far from having reached a peak, continues to increase. According to Carlos Ferrer, president of the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations], the number of unemployed has risen by some 40,000 a month since October 1979.

This social defect is costing Spain about 200 billion pesetas, a figure that could increase to 250 billion pesetas by the end of 1980, according to information supplied to CAMBIO 16 by Social Security. This amount does not help more than half of those who are jobless, with 43 percent of the unemployed not collecting unemployment benefits according to a recent study of the UGT [General Union of Workers].

In the last analysis, the scant resources available are earmarked to assist economically a portion of the unemployed while barely a few million pesetas are left to promote employment, to create jobs rather than pay benefits running for 18 months to the unemployed. "What we should aim for is to allocate more funds for the promotion of employment than for unemployment insurance," Miguel Cuenca, director general for employment, told CAMBIO 16. He went further: It would be desirable that the worker should be able to choose between unemployment insurance and collecting, in a lump sum, assistance to enable him to set up his own business, Cuenca added. But the matter is not so easy. For the present the Ministry of Economy noted that the

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Interministerial Committee on Public Investment has completed an investment program for the 1980-83 period which suggests approximately an outlay of 2 trillion pesetas and which impacts first and foremost on professional training, agriculture (IRYDA [Agrarian Reform and Development Institute] and ICONA [National Institute for the Preservation of Nature]), housing, public works, and energy.

Computations of Unemployment

In all the circles that we consulted there was first a concern to determine whether it would be possible to increase the millions available to pay the unemployed and thus to succeed in having all of them collect assistance. The government, on the basis of its economic program, has undertaken to assist up to 40 percent of the unemployed. The balance is to be financed with contributions from the business sector (2.35 percent of real wages) and the contributions paid by the workers (0.35 percent).

To increase the participation of the state would involve raising the fiscal burden on the taxpayer (which is presently almost impossible according to tax experts consulted by this periodical) or to increase the state's deficit which is already worrisome as it is. Any rise in the contributions of business or wage-earners is not well received besides the fact that it could have counterproductive effects. However, perhaps something could be done in this connection since "the contribution of businessmen and workers to unemployment benefits is the lowest in Europe," Miguel Cuenca told CAMBIO 16.

Inflows for unemployment have failed to cover outlays in the last few years. There is, pending approval of the Cortes, a special credit of 20 billion pesetas to liquidate the deficit on account of the unemployment insurance expenditures of Social Security in 1979. And if no one remedies this history will repeat itself in fiscal 1980. According to information supplied by Social Security to CAMBIO 16, aggregate outlays anticipated for 1980 on account of unemployment will reach 242 billion pesetas. Now then, the collection of contributions will bring in 96 billion pesetas and it is expected that the government will make 85 billion pesetas available. This then leaves a deficit of 61 billion which will have to come from somewhere so that the unemployed may collect every month.

And it is clear that the deficit is getting larger every year because the contributions are not growing in the same proportion as needs and because of the number of unemployed (who, in turn, collect benefits based on increasingly higher wages). Consequently, the government's contribution has grown 20-fold in the past 3 years and the deficit of Social Security itself is growing.

It Is Time for Redistribution

If inputs cannot be increased significantly it will be necessary to determine whether it is possible to reduce unemployment expenditures. Or better,

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given the low rate of coverage, whether it is possible to spend more effectively and cover more necessities with the same revenues. "The [draft of the] Basic Employment Law which will be sent to the general meeting of the congress in the first half of June 1980 does not try to save money but rather to better allocate the available funds," Miguel Cuenca told this periodical.

The government bill--which Socialists and communists have asked the government to withdraw--tries to reduce benefits as a function of contributions (with a scale of 3 months' payments to the worker who has contributed for 6 months' up to 18 months' benefits when a worker has contributed for 3-1/2 years) so that those millions that would be saved may be paid to workers who have problems collecting unemployment benefits today and do not find work.

Miguel Cuenca explained to CAMBIO 16 that special assistance of 75 percent of the minimum wage will be guaranteed--which has nothing to do with the dues contributed to Social Security--for youths (aged from 16 to 25 years of age) seeking their first job in the form of scholarships for occupational training and for adults over 50 years of age whose unemployment benefits have terminated. Also, to women (who have family responsibilities), the disabled, and returning emigrants. There remains the issue of unemployment insurance for the agricultural sector, picked up once more in the Economic Program of Government and which, according to the director general of employment, "is a problem that deserves thorough technical study."

Another improvement being tried in terms of outlays is to place a ceiling on collections in order to avoid having some workers collect 80,000 pesetas for each month of unemployment while there are others who collect nothing. The employment bill sets a ceiling of 220 percent of the interoccupational minimum wage (which would indicate maximum unemployment benefits of 55,000 pesetas, if the request of trade unions for a new minimum wage of 25,000 pesetas is approved).

Funds for Businesses in Trouble

Businesses in trouble account for a sizable portion of the funds for unemployment. In the meantime it is INEM and not the firm which assumes responsibility for wages in the crisis situations accounting for partial unemployment. The control of employment at SEAT [Spanish Passenger Car Company, Inc.], for example, will cost some 2 billion pesetas to Social Security. "That the firm should emerge from the crisis with our assistance is something that is entirely lawful," Miguel Cuenca, director general of employment, noted. "Now then," he added, "when an unemployment control provision is authorized it is because the firm has presented a viable reorganization plan. We also investigate thoroughly the causes of the trouble. We do not give money to a lost cause but only when the firm has a solution [to its predicament]."

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Doing away with fraud seems to be a fundamental point in the sound distribution of millions in unemployment compensation. One out of every three firms fraudulently hires unemployed workers collecting unemployment benefits while only five out of every 100 workers who receive compensation are involved in the fraud of holding down another job, according to the results of the latest survey by INEM. In the January-March 1980 period, fines were imposed on businesses amounting to 130 million pesetas (the highest fine ran to 3 million pesetas). "Our idea is to publicize the sanctions as one more means to fight fraud," Miguel Cuenca told CAMBIO 16. By way of a precedent the Labor Delegation of Granada has already published such names recently in the local newspaper IDEAL.

Administration of Unemployment Funds

Another important problem to solve, according to the experts, is the management of unemployment funds. As of January 1980 INEM has been responsible for unemployment assistance and employment policy. However, it is still Social Security which collects the contributions from the business sector (that is, from the firm and the worker) and which makes payments, even though it does so only on the orders of INEM's treasury. "As for the benefits and as regards the dues collected, we continue to operate as we did 3 years ago," Lorenzo Gil Pelaez, head of the financial economic cabinet of Social Security, told CAMBIO 16.

Up to a few days ago there was a complication in this "transfer of powers" from Social Security to INEM. The latter did not know for how long each unemployed worker seeking compensation had contributed, and it had to use the Social Security's computers. According to Miguel Cuenca, since May 1980 INEM has had this information in some provinces and the process will soon be completed with its own data-processing system.

For 1980 the government also anticipates earmarking 10 billion pesetas to an employment program as well as expanding assistance to agrarian community employment with a program of 11,848 million pesetas. The employment promotion program includes assistance and subsidies to firms, the development of professional training (for which purpose 1,821 million additional pesetas are available), tax assistance and allowances for Social Security, and special aid to underdeveloped zones (El Ferrol, Cadiz, Valles, and Antequera).

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BASQUE, CATALONIAN ECONOMIC MINISTERS ON REGIONAL PLANS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Jun 80 pp 56-59

[Text] Catalonia and the Basque country represent one-third of the Spanish economy and provide employment for almost one out of every four Spaniards. But they are also two regions where the recession has gone deeper. With their governments inaugurated recently, two economic teams are getting ready to improve their economies.

A month after the appointment of the Basque and Catalanian autonomous governments, the various regional government cabinet officials or economic "ministers" are getting ready to block out a minimal administrative structure to begin to put measures and programs into motion. The peripheral administration continues without getting on top of the problems but has failed to complete the processes of the transfer of men and resources serving as support for the autonomous management of the crisis.

"Nowadays," a Basque economic expert told this periodical, "the autonomous regional government cabinet officials for economic matters are sort of 'paper ministers' as long as they do not have sufficient means or margins for maneuver." Catalanian sources consulted by this periodical all assert that "economic self-government" has many limitations even though everything seems to indicate that advances in this field will be more visible here than in the Basque country.

On the other hand, according to declarations by Basque and Catalanian regional government cabinet officials for economic matters consulted by CAMBIO 16, there is general agreement to the effect that it is not possible to create "kingdoms of economic cliques" and that the economic unity of the Spanish state, which they respect, implies a series of restrictions, even though a significant sector of Spanish business may view the autonomous process as a possible inhibiting element to economic unity.

In contrast, those theoretically responsible for the Catalanian and Basque economy concur in asserting, too, that it is not possible to emerge from the crisis without everyone's cooperation and especially that Madrid should

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not take any far-reaching measures for the Basque or Catalanian economy without consulting the sections involved and without receiving their cooperation. For the time being the contacts among Pedro Luis Uriarte, Basque regional government cabinet official for economic matters [minister of the economy], Ramon Trias Fargas of the Generalitat [Catalonian regional government], and the deputy prime minister for economic affairs and the minister of economy have been qualified as "cordial."

According to Uriarte, "we are drafting jointly with the ministers a provisional formula so that we may secure the minimum resources indispensable to putting the government into motion, to meeting all urgent investments, and to paying wages."

In the intermediate term what the autonomous regions' ministers wish is that transfers be accelerated, that the Financing Law of the Autonomous Communities be initiated, and--especially the Basques--that economic agreements should be signed. Carlos Garaicoechea, president of the Basque government, in the face of the [central] government's slowness in initiating discussions concerning agreements, has unilaterally appointed his representatives on the Committee of Transfers and on the Committee of Agreements so that they may begin to identify the options of the autonomous regions.

A few days ago the president of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol, held a 9-hour meeting with the heads of Catalonia's economic departments, other senior officials in those regional government cabinets, and various advisers and experts with the purpose of drafting the economic action program which Pujol has committed himself to present to the Catalanian parliament in September 1980.

In the meantime, the principal regional government cabinet officials for economic matters gave CAMBIO 16 a preview of the fundamental lines of this program.


The economic plan of the Basque government is less advanced and the various regional government cabinet officials are completing their collection of data and making up their departments, appointing the various teams.

Ramon Trias Fargas (Economy and Finance): "We Seek a Mixed Economy"

"We hope that the economic-social model of the most advanced democracies of Western Europe will prosper in Catalonia," Ramon Trias Fargas, adviser for economy and finance at the Generalitat, who holds a master's degree in economics from the University of Chicago, is president of Convergencia Democratica [Democratic Convergence]--Jordi Pujol's party--and a deputy to the congress for the [Catalonian] Convergence and Unity coalition, commented.

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


Key:

1. Catalonia
2. Ranking in terms of per capita income
3. Ranking in terms of total production
4. Production:

Agriculture	8 percent
Industry	54 percent
Construction	6 percent
Textiles	8 percent
Metallic products	15 percent
Chemicals	8 percent
Services	38 percent
5. Population 5,122,567
Economically active population 2,046,000
6. Growth of unemployment
(as a percentage of the economically active population)
7. Number of unemployed 200,000 (unemployed youth, 46.7 percent)
8. Estimated
9. Exports: 28 percent of total Spanish exports
10. Number of businesses in trouble: 3,000
11. Share of total production: 20 percent
12. Percentage of public investment in Catalonia: 11 percent

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Key:

1. Basque country
2. Ranking in terms of per capita income
3. Ranking in terms of total production
4. Production:

Chemicals	4 percent
Paper and cardboard	5.1 percent
Machinery	4.8 percent
Metallic products	21.3 percent
Rubber	5.4 percent
Electrical equipment	5.8 percent
5. Population 1,878,636
Economically active population 800,000
6. Growth of unemployment
(as a percentage of the economically active population)
7. Recorded unemployment 71,338 (unemployed youth, 56 percent: unemployed women, 33 percent)
8. Estimated
9. Exports: 16 percent of total Spanish exports
10. Number of firms suspending payments: 125
11. Investments:

Down 4.39 percent annually between 1974 and 1978
Down 32.61 percent between 1978 and 1979

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Trias Fargas advocates a mixed economy. "Mixed," he explained, "because we believe that private enterprise and the market economy constitute the least inefficient combination. Mixed, because we think that there is no de-bureaucratized and imaginative public sector capable of eliminating in the field of social justice the imbalances that could result from the free enterprise system. All this must be situated within the context of the energy crisis and the third industrial revolution," Trias Fargas continued. "We may perhaps anticipate a stage of accelerated changes in which private initiative, advised by a well-informed government, seems to us the best way to weather a temporary situation," he summed up.

The major lines of the Generalitat's economic policy will be presented to the parliament of Catalonia in September 1980. "It is clear," Trias anticipated, "that we cannot intervene more in economic policy by contemplating further control of aggregate demand. In contrast, we believe that we shall be able in the intermediate and long range to take structural measures that would improve the situation on the supply side." He added: "We shall turn to given sectors and even to specific firms where we can indicate microeconomic policy."

The regional government cabinet official for economic matters considers that the principal problem is unemployment "which in our opinion will only be solved by the resumption of private investment with the support of some selective public investment even though the latter will not depend on us."

In the fiscal realm Trias Fargas does not plan to request any kind of privileges. "Neither do we want the tax burden to fall on Catalonians beyond their real ability to pay. At any rate, for the time being there is no thought that the Generalitat will levy its own taxes given that we do not wish to increase the fiscal burden." The Catalanian regional government cabinet official would like to have the freedom to tax enjoyed by the federated states of the United States and considers that "both the text of the [Autonomy] Statute and the Financing Law of the Autonomous Communities seem restrictive to me."

Trias Fargas does not believe in confrontations among different regions and national groups of the Spanish state and thinks that "once the rights of the Catalanian nation are secured through the present Statute or its reform in the constitutional field, the Catalonians want to assume their responsibilities on a basis of equality with all the peoples of Spain." Finally, and referring to the resources that are available, Trias Fargas considers that "in order to subsist the Generalitat needs a minimal infrastructure that is justified on the basis of the Statute, through the transfer of the costs of central services, and on the basis of the state budget for the newly created institutions."

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Pedro Luis Uriarte (Economy and Treasury): "It Is Necessary To Establish a Basque Public Sector"

"The economic program pursued by the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] is a government program that we could call progressive but which still needs to be implemented," Pedro Luis Uriarte Santamaria, economist at the Deusto Jesuit University and subsequently a professor, a PNV partisan for a few years now, told CAMBIO 16. And while he is working with his team, in the program he proposes that "the basic goal that we have is to fight unemployment as much as possible because it is the fundamental economic, social, and I would even say political problem which the Basque country is facing at this time."

The regional government cabinet official for economic matters [minister of the economy] believes that it is necessary to fight unemployment by two means: One is by increasing private investment, which will call for a series of measures to create a better environment and retrieve the confidence of the business sector. The other is by increasing public investment, improving the existing shortage of social facilities (that is, basically improving the construction industry), and establishing a Basque public sector.

Pedro Luis Uriarte comes from the Bank of Bilbao where he was regional director for the Basque country. Uriarte explained why he believes that Garaicoechea has picked him to steer the Basque economy. "I believe that he selected me because of the familiarity that I have with Basque industry where I worked before joining the bank and then also because I am a specialist in planning and control."

As the one responsible for the fiscal issue Uriarte was categorical: "The Basque government will not seek privileges for the Basque country. The fact is that cognizance given to a tradition which, in the case of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, was eliminated by the force of arms does not mean any privilege." He added: "We recognize that we have a fundamental duty of solidarity with nations and regions making up the state, a duty spelled out in Article 41 of the Autonomy Statute. We are not trying to create tax havens or to reduce our tax burden with reference to the rest of the state."

Pedro Luis Uriarte believes that the PNV, through the economic agreement, "will have all taxes under its control except those pertaining to fiscal monopolies and customs revenues, which logically pertain to the [central] government. The agreement, he added, merely makes possible the Basque country's own management of its expenditures which, being closer to the people, can be more effective than the central administration."

In connection with the rest of the state, the regional government cabinet official for economic matters wished to put unfounded fears to rest. "The traditional economic relations of the Basque country with the rest of the state will not be altered. Agreements are a traditional system

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that we have always had and which will make it possible for us to have better administration and to have a choice about where we wish to place the resources available to us."

Will there be sufficient resources? "We shall, rather, have resources. We have to spend public funds in a prudent, very sparing, and very controlled way. We shall try to give the Basque public administration a more accessible and more flexible image as if it were that of a private enterprise striving to earn money."

Mario Fernandez Pelas (Labor): "Unemployment Will Get Worse"

"The first problem which the Basque government has to face is unemployment," Mario Fernandez Pelas, regional government cabinet official for labor [minister of labor] and a man trained at the Deusto Jesuit University where he was also a faculty member, told CAMBIO 16. "The unemployment levels in the Basque country," Fernandez Pelas added, "are growing at a rate greater than the unemployment levels in the state overall. There will probably be problems in the suspension of payments [debt moratorium] and in the regulation of important employment control provisions. The year 1980 will be worse than 1979."

While seeking solutions to unemployment Fernandez Pelas believes that it is necessary to be realistic and not to create false illusions. "As long as the Basque government does not have appropriate powers transferred to it, while no negotiations take place, and no economic agreement becomes operative, what the Basque government will be able to do is to study the problem and pressure the central administration but it will not find its own solutions."

As regional government cabinet official for labor Fernandez Pelas told this periodical that his first step will be "to find a solution for the restructuring of firms in trouble."

Regarding the topic of labor conflict, the regional government cabinet official for labor wished to check that image of the Basque country as a powderkeg. "It is not an established fact that in the Basque country labor conflict is notably greater than that which exists in the rest of the state." He attributed this to the spirit of negotiation observed by the labor unions and employers' associations of Guipuzcoa Province.

Carlos Blasco de Imaz (Commerce and Tourism): Silent Because "He Is Too Busy"

After 2 weeks of literally being pursued by CAMBIO 16 Blasco de Imaz, Basque regional government cabinet official for commerce and tourism [minister of commerce and tourism], activist of the PNV for some months now, a lawyer, a business adviser and promoter of Operation "Basque Export," did not wish to answer the questions posed by CAMBIO 16, alleging that he was "too busy." CAMBIO 16's delegation in the Basque country has

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drawn up a written protest and sent it to Carlos Garaicoechea, president of the Basque government, "because of his [Blasco de Imaz'] inappropriate attitude and his known bad relations with the press."

Javier Garcia Egocheaga (Industry): "Collective Effort, the Only Solution"

"The industrial crisis in the Basque country is a far-reaching crisis which has some important structural defects and which, furthermore, is strongly influenced by the international recession and the specific crisis of the Spanish economy, Javier Garcia Egocheaga, a native of San Sebastian who left the General Directorate of Iron and Steel, Metallurgical and Naval Industries in Madrid to take charge of the Basque regional government cabinet office for industry [minister of industry], explained to CAMBIO 16.

"This crisis, undoubtedly extraordinarily acute, has only one solution which in the last analysis passes through global consciousness-raising and collective effort," Garcia Egocheaga opined.

The initial steps of the regional government cabinet office for industry are, for the time being, an effort to organize a fluid, flexible and effective administration. "Already in the realm of action," Garcia Egocheaga added, "the fundamental element will be promotion--in the business and financial fields and in the technological fields as well as in the evolution of small- and medium-sized businesses.

Garcia Egocheaga, trained at the Deusto Jesuit University and subsequently a faculty member at that institution, was general manager of TUBACEX from 1970 to 1978, when he joined the cabinet. He recognized that a certain exodus of businessmen from the Basque country has occurred even though "this exodus has to be qualified."

While seeking solutions Javier Garcia Egocheaga believes that what needs to be done is "to carry out a process of industrial improvement and, furthermore, to seriously prop up what is available and to develop what we could call our strong points."

The regional government cabinet official for industry puts his faith in the capital goods sector where there is great potential in the Basque economy. "What will not appear to us is Our Lady of Lourdes," he said.

Vicens Oller (Industry and Energy): "The Firm, Basis of Our Industrial Policy"

"There is no doubt that the industrial crisis goes beyond any territorial limit in which one may try to situate it. On our part we believe that as long as industrial policy operates within a framework which unquestionably conditions it, it is possible to find approaches to guide the crisis on the basis of an intimate mutual understanding between the public administration

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and the private sector as regards the pattern of the policies to be followed and their initiation," Vicens Oller, the [Catalonian] Generalitat's regional government cabinet official for industry and energy [minister of industry and energy], explained to CAMBIO 16.

"It is not a matter of whether or not to take measures independently of Madrid but rather of contributing all that is within our reach," he added. Vicens Oller was director of CEAM [Metallurgical Consultation Study Center] up to his appointment as director of SIEC [Catalonian Information and Studies Service]. He was also president of the Economic Circle of Barcelona and secretary general of the employers' Project Development.

Regarding the importance of business investment in Catalonia, Oller believes that "the businessman is seeking from a professional viewpoint rational arguments to improve his business and engage in new investments. There has been a change of expectations in some people and, undoubtedly, the obligation of the Catalonian public administration is to improve to the maximum their specification and implementation."

In terms of energy Vicens Oller believes that it is not a matter of entering or not entering the nuclear controversy. "What is involved," he explained, "is to engage in analysis and action based on the aggregate possibilities that we have within our reach in the short, medium and long range both in the area of production and in that of energy conservation." And he added that the polemics must be directed to criteria which consider both economic and social well-being.

Joan Rigol (Labor): "It Is Necessary To Seek a Catalonian Framework-Agreement"

Industrial unemployment in Catalonia, specifically in the Barcelona region, is even higher than the national average in Spain, according to what Joan Rigol, the Generalitat's regional government cabinet official for labor [minister of labor], told CAMBIO 16. "In Madrid," he added, "the unemployment problem is seen from a strictly administrative viewpoint, the central government's major concern being that of managing the funds slated to assist the unemployed. Here, at the Generalitat, the problem must be viewed in a different manner with the introduction of a concept of zones which demands concrete solution in each of them. Everything that it has must be mobilized for creating potential work."

The Generalitat does not enjoy transfers of public funds for unemployment compensation. "It is necessary that we implement our unemployment policy," Rigol explained, "which is that of managing all the funds flowing through this region, that of propping up all the firms that are salvageable, at times through emergency measures taken with credits obtained in Madrid and at times seeking our own solutions."

Joan Rigol, 37 years old, an individual belonging to the UDC [Democratic Union of Catalonia], is very familiar with the business world since he was secretary general of PIMEC [Small- and Medium-Sized Businesses of Catalonia].

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The regional government cabinet official for labor showed himself in favor of a framework-agreement "that would facilitate the prospects of firms, that would increase productivity as a function of the market shares that must be met. The Generalitat can promote in Catalonia a framework-agreement open to all economic and social forces without discrimination."

For the time being Joal Rigol does not have many means. "This regional government cabinet," he explained, "has seen transferred to it the immense majority of problems but not the immense majority of solutions. While waiting for our jurisdiction to broaden, the first thing that we plan to do is to put into motion once again the Catalanian Labor Council which was already in operation at the time of the provisional Generalitat and which is a consultative organ that welcomes all the social forces."

Francesco Sanuy (Commerce and Tourism): "Catalonian Exports Are More Competitive"

"There is only one foreign trade for the entire Spanish state, as mentioned in the Constitution, and therefore trade policy must be blocked out by the central government in Madrid," Francesco Sanuy, the Generalitat's regional government cabinet official for commerce and tourism [minister of commerce and tourism], told CAMBIO 16. He added: "It may be that specific sectors of activity, because of their high concentration in Catalonia, are felt more proximately by the Generalitat and therefore, before a given problem, it may get around to suggesting some type of action to the central government."

Once the responsibilities in general areas are identified, Sanuy believes that "the Generalitat would be able to develop promotional activity in some fields and sectors." Specifically, the program of his party-- [Catalonian] Convergence and Unity--includes the establishment of a Catalanian Institute for the Promotion of Foreign Trade.

The regional government cabinet official for commerce and tourism believes that "Catalonia has an export industry above the average in Spain and that its level comes very close to the average level of Western competition."

"In addition to Europe," Francesco Sanuy added, "there are other countries of Latin America, the Maghreb, and the Middle East which are open to specific sectors of the Catalanian industry: Engineering and consulting, turnkey plants, and capital equipment."

Catalonia hosts one out of every five tourists visiting Spain (21.83 percent to be exact). For Sanuy the recession in the tourist sector is a world problem and "one needs imagination to obviate the downswing by developing facilities that are different and sophisticated."

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